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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CONCEPTIONS OF THE VESSEL: ABU ALI, HABEAS CORPUS, AND
THE DARK SIDE OF THE “WAR ON TERRORISM”

MICHAEL PAISNER*

INTRODUCTION
On September 16, 2001, Vice President Dick Cheney stated on the
television show Meet the Press that the United States would need to conduct
the “war on terrorism” in part through “the dark side,” and that “[a] lot of what
needs to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion,
using sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies, if
we’re going to be successful.” 1 Whether the judiciary has a role in monitoring
and policing the dark side of the “war on terrorism” remains a subject of much
contestation. The trio of detainee cases in 2004—Rasul v. Bush, 2 Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 3 and Rumsfeld v. Padilla 4—suggested an unwillingness on the part
of the Supreme Court to stand completely on the sidelines while the political
branches hammer out the rules of engagement. 5 These cases raised as many
questions as they answered regarding the breadth of federal court jurisdiction
over habeas corpus petitions brought by overseas detainees and the precise
contours of the package of rights that such detainees enjoy.
In signaling that the unique status of Guantanamo Bay as a territory under
exclusive United States “jurisdiction and control” was a factor contributing to
the outcome in Rasul, the Supreme Court may indeed have encouraged the
Executive to push the “war on terrorism” even further into the dark side in an
effort to escape the purview of American courts. 6 One of the controversial
methods employed by the Bush Administration has been “extraordinary
rendition,” whereby suspected terrorists are transferred outside of normal

* Associate, Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP. The views expressed in this Article are the
author's alone, and in no way represent the views of Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP. The
author wishes to thank Professor Henry Monaghan, Professor Harold Edgar, Professor Debra A.
Livingston, and Graham O’Donoghue for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106.
2. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
3. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
4. 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
5. See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
6. See Rasul, 542 U.S. 466; id. at 477 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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extradition procedures to foreign countries for interrogation. 7 The program
was not an innovation of the “war on terrorism,” seventy suspects were
rendered prior to the September 11th attacks. 8 But the Central Intelligence
Agency received broad new authorities in the wake of September 11th to render
suspects solely for the purpose of detention and interrogation, and with no
immediate prospect of criminal proceedings. 9 Thereafter, the number of
terrorism suspects rendered increased dramatically, with an estimated 100 to
150 renditions through March of 2005. 10
In this light, the decision of the District Court for the District of Columbia
in the case of Abu Ali v. Ashcroft 11 raises complex questions generally about
the extent to which United States courts will venture into the dark side, and
more specifically how they will evaluate Executive assertions that certain
decisions regarding the fate of citizens are beyond the realm of judicial inquiry.
Abu Ali involved a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in a United States
district court by an American citizen, Omar Abu Ali, who alleged that: (i) the
United States government had initiated his arrest by Saudi Arabian officials
and was controlling his ongoing detention; (ii) Saudi Arabia would release him
immediately to United States officials upon request; (iii) American agents had
interrogated him while in Saudi custody; and (iv) the Saudis provided him with
no judicial process and tortured him. 12 On December 16, 2004, the district
court determined that it could assert jurisdiction over the case as a matter of
law, rejected the government’s motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds,
and issued an order instructing the government and Abu Ali’s attorney to agree
upon and submit a proposed order governing jurisdictional discovery. 13
Such a discovery order likely would have forced the United States to
“disclose evidence detailing its role in Abu Ali’s detention and
interrogation.” 14 Perhaps in response to this threat, the American government
whisked Abu Ali to the United States, where he was indicted in a federal
district court in February 2005 on charges of, inter alia, providing material
support to Al Qaeda and plotting to kill President Bush. 15 Ultimately, in light
of these subsequent events, the district court granted the government’s motion
to dismiss Abu Ali’s habeas petition, concluding that it had been mooted by

7. See Mayer, supra note 1.
8. Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Rule Change Lets CIA Freely Send Suspects Abroad,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at A1.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 350 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004).
12. Id. at 30.
13. Id.
14. Spencer Ackerman, Suspect Policy, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 14, 2005, at 14.
15. See United States v. Abu Ali, Docket Sheet, No. 05-CR-0053 (E.D. Va. 2005).
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the initiation of the criminal trial. 16 However, given the evidence of the
proclivity of the United States government to subcontract terrorism-related
interrogations to foreign governments, the vexing issues of jurisdiction,
separation of powers, and the role of the federal courts that the habeas petition
raised remain pressing. Likely as a result of the thoroughness of the court’s
analysis, the case has become an important precedent, framing the subsequent
inquiry conducted by two district courts into whether to assert jurisdiction over
habeas petitions brought by American citizens detained by the multi-national
force in Iraq. 17
The Abu Ali case was salient and difficult because of the extent to which it
pushed the outer boundaries of the habeas remedy in the context of allegations
that suggested violation of the basic norms of due process and the rule of law.
The presumption is that the habeas statute applies (and that its application is
perhaps constitutionally compelled) anytime that an American citizen alleges
detention in violation of his constitutional rights. 18 Indeed, the trend in the
case law has been a clear progression towards relaxed interpretations of the
habeas statute that support jurisdiction across a wide range of circumstances. 19
Nevertheless, the procedural conundrums posed by the Abu Ali allegations
stretched to its breaking point the presumption that any detention of American
citizens at the behest of the Executive is within the jurisdictional ambit of the
habeas statute.

16. See Abu Ali v. Gonzales, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20312 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2005).
17. See, e.g., Omar v. Harvey, 416 F. Supp. 2d 19, 21 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d 479 F.3d 1 (D.C.
Cir. Feb. 9, 2007); Mohammed v. Harvey, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75717 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d
Munaf v. Geren, 482 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 6, 2007). While Omar and Mohammed, both of
which were affirmed by the D.C. Circuit, reached divergent conclusions as to whether there was
jurisdiction, neither case, nor the subsequent D.C. Circuit decisions affirming them, challenged
the main principle established in Abu Ali—“‘the United States may not avoid the habeas
jurisdiction of the federal courts by enlisting a foreign ally as an intermediary to detain the
citizen.’” Mohammed, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75717, at *30-31 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting Abu Ali,
350 F. Supp. 2d at 41); see also Omar, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
18. See Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. 318, 325-26 (1867) (“[The Act of 1867] is of the most
comprehensive character. It brings within the habeas corpus jurisdiction of every court and of
every judge every possible case of privation of liberty contrary to the National Constitution,
treaties, or laws. It is impossible to widen this jurisdiction.”); see also Chatman-Bey v.
Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 807 (D.C. Cir.1988) (en banc) ("[M]odern habeas jurisprudence
emphasizes the breadth and flexibility of the Great Writ in vindicating the fundamental concern in
a democratic society of checking the powers of the state vis-a-vis an individual in custody.").
19. Including the absence of the prisoner from the reviewing court’s district, see, e.g., Burns
v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), and various situations that would not fit under traditional
physical definitions of “in custody,” see, e.g., Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968); Carafas v.
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
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In answering the jurisdictional issue, the Abu Ali court performed a classic
internal limits/external limits analysis. 20 In addressing the internal limits, the
court inquired if, as a matter of straightforward statutory interpretation, the
habeas statute granted jurisdiction over the specific factual setting of a citizen
held by a foreign power allegedly at the behest of the United States
government. 21 Concluding that it did, the court in the external portion of the
analysis considered whether any one of a number of related, largely
constitutionally-rooted doctrines external to the jurisdiction-granting statute—
the separation of powers, the political question doctrine, and the act of state
doctrine—sufficed to block the exercise of statutory jurisdiction. 22 The court
analyzed each of the external doctrines as independent bodies of law, and
determined that each, in turn, lacked sufficient force to block jurisdiction.
Legal opinions must adhere to doctrinal formalities, but formal doctrine
likely did not, in fact, determine the outcome in Abu Ali. This likely is because
the case brought together three powerful and conflicting legal principles: The
due process rights of citizens, the insulation of core Executive foreign policy
determinations from judicial intrusion, and the important role of the habeas
remedy as a guarantor of individual rights. Further, all three considerations
were at their most compelling, since the alleged violation of Abu Ali’s due
process rights was quite serious, the interest of the Executive in reducing
judicial intrusion into the details of its interactions with foreign sovereigns was
strong, and the problems attending application of the habeas remedy to the
alleged factual situation of a foreign government holding a United States
citizen at the behest of the United States government were vexing. When
confronted with such powerful contending considerations, judicial mindsets
help frame formal legal analysis. In Abu Ali, the consistent tenor of the court’s
analysis reveals that its underlying abhorrence of unreviewable executive
detention and willingness to assert judicial authority to prevent such detention
drove the final outcome in the case. 23
20. See generally Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 272, 298-318 (2004) (discussing overlapping Article I, 8 powers and
limitations).
21. Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 41-51 (D.D.C. 2004).
22. Id. at 57—65.
23. This article’s use of the term “judicial mindset” should not be taken as an assertion that a
court’s decision-making is impermissibly ends-oriented or political; rather, it is a claim that in the
presence of clashing legal principles in areas of the law that are fraught with complexity, a court
will often simplify the analysis, and thus render it manageable, by conceptualizing the problem
through the lens of a particular principle that it views as foundational. As the legal realists have
long recognized, principles are subject to being interpreted broadly or narrowly, language subject
to characterization as dicta or holding, depending on which interpretation or characterization suits
the purposes of the opinion writer. The malleability of precedent is revealed with particular
clarity in two recent D.C. Circuit decisions attempting to apply the Supreme Court’s 1948
decision in Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948)—a model of neither clarity nor

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

CONCEPTIONS OF THE VESSEL

313

Underneath the formal doctrinal analysis, the Abu Ali court
conceptualized the case before it in relatively stark terms: whether the textual
allocation of the foreign affairs power to the political branches, and in
particular the Executive, rendered unreviewable the Executive’s violation of a
citizen’s due process rights by means of a foreign power. 24 Once the court
framed the choice as one between the Executive’s foreign affairs powers and
an individual’s due process rights, the decision to assert jurisdiction became
obvious. Permeating the court’s opinion is a sense that, whatever the
arguments may be for granting extreme deference to the Executive’s foreign
policy determinations, they cannot justify the judiciary turning away from an
individual who asserts that the Executive has egregiously violated his due
process rights.
In framing the case in that way, the Abu Ali court chose to ignore a set
of powerful opposing considerations that render the assertion of jurisdiction
more questionable. Most saliently, the court devoted little attention to the
actual possibility that it could provide Abu Ali with a viable, final remedy
should the merits turn out in his favor. Indeed, the court’s analyses of the
separation of powers objections to the assertion of jurisdiction focused almost
exclusively on the impediments to any judicial inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding Abu Ali’s detention. The court focused no attention on the
separation of powers or judicial capacity obstacles to providing Abu Ali with
an effective judicial remedy.
This seeming lack of concern with potential remedial obstacles hints at the
Abu Ali court’s underlying vision of the role occupied by the federal judiciary
within the constitutional scheme. The Abu Ali court was prepared to expound
on constitutional questions and engage in intrusive discovery even though
there was no effective remediation available. This approach is consistent with
the special functions model, which conceptualizes the judiciary—especially the
Supreme Court—as an essential safeguard against overreaching by the

comprehensiveness—to the question of whether a United States district court had jurisdiction to
hear a petition for habeas corpus brought by an American citizen held in Iraq by the American
military operating under the authority of a multinational force. See Omar, 479 F.3d at 1; Munaf,
482 F.3d at 582; see also infra notes 47-59.
24. See Abu Ali, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 40 (“[T]he United States is in effect arguing for nothing
less than the unreviewable power to separate an American citizen from the most fundamental of
his constitutional rights merely by choosing where he will be detained or who will detain him. . . .
This Court simply cannot agree that under our constitutional system of government the executive
retains such power free from judicial scrutiny when the fundamental rights of citizens have
allegedly been violated.”). By contrast, in evaluating whether it had jurisdiction over a habeas
petition brought by an American citizen in the custody of the multinational force in Iraq, the
Mohammed court adopted the mindset that habeas jurisdiction turns on the identity of the tribunal
(i.e., whether of the United States or not), and interpreted potentially problematic precedents
through that lens. Mohammed, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75717.
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coordinate branches. Such an approach has much to recommend it in terms of
bringing Executive misdeeds to light, but also risks judicial overreach and
adventurism. The private rights model, by contrast, counsels that, in the
absence of the possibility of effective judicial relief, jurisdiction should not lie,
even if it will mean that an individual will be denied judicial review of the
wrongs he has suffered. As I will conclude in this article, the decision of a
court to adhere to either a special functions approach or a private rights
approach, and thus the willingness to refuse to assert jurisdiction when
individual rights are at stake, should depend in large part on whether effective
mechanisms besides habeas are in place to prevent unconstitutional Executive
action.
I. ABU ALI’S JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS IN LIGHT OF THE RASUL, HAMDI,
AND PADILLA DECISIONS
A.

The Abu Ali Court’s Assessment of the Habeas Statute’s “In Custody”
and “Immediate Custodian” Requirements

The threshold analysis for the Abu Ali court was the determination as to
whether the habeas statute by its own terms authorized federal court
jurisdiction over a petition brought by a United States citizen detained by a
foreign state, allegedly at the behest of the United States government. The Abu
Ali court approached this question with a mindset focused on the importance of
ensuring, through the mechanism of the habeas remedy, the availability of
federal judicial oversight over Executive detentions. 25 The Abu Ali court
addressed two main jurisdictional arguments, both rooted in the language of
the habeas statute. First, the court observed that courts have interpreted the
language of the statute as requiring habeas petitioners to direct their petitions
(i) at their immediate custodian 26 and (ii) to courts with jurisdiction over

25. Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d. 28, 39 (D.D.C. 2004) (“There is no principle more
sacred to the jurisprudence of our country or more essential to the liberty of its citizens than the
right to be free from arbitrary and indefinite detention at the whim of the executive. . . . [The right
to be free from arbitrary executive detention] draws its force from and would be meaningless
without the ability of the citizen to challenge his detention through a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.”). This mindset is common to courts adjudicating in this fraught area. See, e.g., Omar,
416 F. Supp. 2d at 28 (“The court's obligations . . . requires [sic] inquiry into the legality of
American officials holding American citizens.”). Notably, this same mindset in favor of ensuring
the reviewability of executive action also suffused the Abu Ali court’s subsequent analysis of
potential external bars to the exercise of habeas jurisdiction. See infra Part II.A.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (“The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person
having custody of the person detained.”); see Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885)
("[T]hese provisions contemplate a proceeding against some person who has the immediate
custody of the party detained, with the power to produce the body of such party before the court
or judge, that he may be liberated if no sufficient reason is shown to the contrary.") (emphasis
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custodians in the district of confinement. 27 Rumsfeld v. Padilla reaffirmed
both general principles with respect to “core” habeas challenges to present
physical confinement. 28
However, as the Abu Ali court observed that, according to Padilla, the
Supreme Court has “long implicitly recognized an exception to the immediate
custodian rule in the military context where an American citizen is detained
outside the territorial jurisdiction of any district court.” 29 Padilla cited two
cases challenging the overseas detention of citizens in which the District Court
for the District of Columbia had asserted jurisdiction over superior officials
located in the United States. 30 The Abu Ali court summed up the status of the
law with respect to the possibility of an exception to the territorial requirement
for citizens held overseas:
[T]his Court cannot disregard a rule of law that the Supreme Court described
as “recognized” in one recent decision (Padilla); that was at the heart of both
the reasoning and the outcome in another recent decision (Rasul); that it
discussed in some detail in an earlier decision (Braden); and that was
necessary to the holding of one decision involving an American citizen
detained overseas (Ex rel. Toth, where the Court affirmed the district court’s
issuance of the writ), and to the analysis of another (Burns, where the Court
declined to issue the writ, but nevertheless addressed its jurisdiction over, and
then the merits of, the petitioner’s claim). 31

added); see also Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494-495 (1973)
("The writ of habeas corpus" acts upon "the person who holds [the detainee] in what is alleged to
be unlawful custody" (citing Wales, 114 U.S. at 574)).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (limiting district courts to granting habeas relief “within their
respective jurisdictions"); see Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 618 (1961) (stating that the
writ is only issuable “within the district of confinement”).
28. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 433 (2004) (“[T]he default rule is that the proper
respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not the Attorney General
or some other remote supervisory official.”); id. at 437 (“The plain language of the habeas statute
thus confirms the general rule that for core habeas petitions challenging present physical
confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement.”).
29. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 433 n.9; see also Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410
U.S. 484, 498 (1973) (noting exception to territorial provisions of habeas statute where
“American citizens confined overseas (and thus outside the territory of any district court) have
sought relief in habeas corpus”).
30. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 433 n.9. In Burns v. Wilson, the Court without discussion
asserted jurisdiction over the Secretary of Defense when two servicemen convicted for crimes
committed in Guam and detained overseas sought a writ of habeas corpus. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
Similarly, in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, the Court asserted jurisdiction over (and
granted habeas relief on the merits against) the Secretary of the Air Force in the case of an exservicemen arrested in the United States and taken to Korea for military trial. 350 U.S. 11
(1955).
31. Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d. 28, 44-45 (D.D.C. 2004).
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Thus armed with the premise that the exception for extraterritorial detention by
the military was firmly entrenched, the Abu Ali court concluded that there was
no “broad rule precluding federal court jurisdiction over the habeas petition of
a citizen held overseas.” 32
The Abu Ali court also addressed the “in custody” requirement of the
habeas statute. 33 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a petitioner must be “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 34 The
Abu Ali court’s mindset in interpreting this provision clearly was favorable to
expanding the jurisdictional reach of the statute. 35 The court certainly rooted
its analysis in the statutory language, indicating that while “there must be some
involvement of United States officials . . . any attempt to read a requirement
that the individual be in the actual physical custody of the United States does
not find footing in the text of the statute itself.” 36 However, the court also
resorted to general principles, averring that “[w]hen determining whether a
petition falls within the ‘in custody’ language of the habeas statute, courts must
avoid ‘legalistic’ and ‘formalistic’ distinctions and honor the ‘breadth and
flexibility of the Great Writ.’” 37 Buttressing this approach, the court observed
that “courts have universally held that actual physical custody of an individual
by the respondent is unnecessary for habeas jurisdiction to exist. . . . Courts
instead have read the language of the statute to provide for jurisdiction where
the official possesses either actual or ‘constructive’ custody of the
petitioner.” 38 The court went on to discuss decisions in which habeas
jurisdiction was found when “the executive or some other government official
was working through the intermediary of a State (Braden), a private individual
(Jung Ah Lung) or a private corporation.” Noting that the statute itself fails to
carve out “an exception where the physical custodian is a foreign body,” the
court concluded there is no “basis in the habeas statute for denying jurisdiction
merely because the executive is allegedly working through a foreign ally.” 39

32. Id.
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (asserting in relevant part that district courts may only issue a
writ of habeas corpus to an individual if he “is in custody,” either “under or by color of the
authority of the United States" or "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States").
34. Id.
35. Abu Ali, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 47.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 46.
38. Id. at 47.
39. Id. at 49.
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The Abu Ali Court’s Mindset of Preventing Unreviewable Executive
Detentions Colors Its Analysis of Keefe and Hirota

The Abu Ali court’s analysis of the habeas statute was largely sound, but
glossed over the doctrinal complexity and confusion underlying seemingly
contradictory reasoning in Rasul and Padilla. The Abu Ali court’s narrative of
the habeas cases as suggesting a clear trend towards an expanding
jurisdictional reach of the habeas statutes demonstrated its overriding concern
with protecting individual rights, a concern that comports with one of the
crucial background norms of American law: there shall be no unreviewable
Executive detentions. 40 The narrative of a continually expanding ambit for
statutory habeas jurisdiction was also necessary to the court’s extension of that
jurisdiction beyond its hitherto recognized limits to encompass the novel
predicament of a United States citizen detained by a foreign country, allegedly
at the behest of the United States government. 41
The Abu Ali court’s treatment of Keefe v. Dulles 42 and Hirota v.
MacArthur 43 demonstrates how the court’s driving mindset of preventing
unreviewable Executive detentions colored its analysis. In Keefe, the wife of a
United States army private convicted by a French court and imprisoned for
assaulting a cab driver brought a habeas petition against a number of United
States officials, alleging that “those officials had conspired to deprive her
husband of his liberty.” 44 Based on the petitioner’s factual assertion that a
French court ordered her husband’s imprisonment, the D.C. Circuit found that
her actual allegation was that the named officials were “indirectly causing her
husband’s present incarceration by not preventing the French from taking,
trying, convicting and confining him.” 45 Since the complaint “alleges he is
detained by French civil authorities,” the court concluded that it lacked
statutory habeas jurisdiction because “there is no one within the jurisdiction of

40. See Rasul, 542 U.S. 466, 472-73 (2004) (emphasizing deep roots of habeas in English
common law and availability of habeas review in a “wide variety of cases involving Executive
detention”); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 95 (1869) ("The great writ of habeas corpus has been
for centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom"); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Enemy Combatants and Separation of Powers, 1 J. NAT. SEC. L. & POL’Y 73, 86
(positing that permitting “unreviewable executive detentions ‘would upset the constitutional
balance of “a workable government” and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III.’”
(quoting U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974)).
41. Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, memorandum opinion 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2004) (“Petitioners' agency
formulation of habeas jurisdiction would expand the notion of custody well beyond its traditional
meaning, across national borders and up a chain of attribution to the Attorney General of the
United States.”).
42. United States ex rel. Keefe v. Dulles, 222 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
43. Hirota v MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
44. Keefe, 222 F.2d at 391.
45. Id.
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the court who is responsible for his detention and who would be an appropriate
respondent.” 46
Keefe counsels that habeas petitions seeking orders directing specific
diplomatic communications by government officials cannot succeed; a
principle that would seem to control the Abu Ali situation. Nonetheless, the
Abu Ali court distinguished Keefe on three basic grounds: (i) the Keefe court
interpreted the petition as alleging a failure on the part of United States
officials to properly seek Keefe’s release, while Abu Ali alleged that United
States officials were responsible for his detention; (ii) unlike Abu Ali, Keefe
had his day in (a French) court; and (iii) Keefe was decided at a time when the
Supreme Court was interpreting the habeas statute much more formalistically.
Of these distinctions, only the third-the observed movement away from strict
formalism in the Supreme Court’s approach to the habeas statute-bears
strongly on the import of Keefe’s holding. The other two grounds for
distinguishing the case are indeed (potentially) relevant differences; however,
they do not speak to the core conclusion of Keefe: habeas is not the appropriate
vehicle for a petitioner seeking a remedy consisting of a court order
commanding the Executive to direct specific communications to a foreign
government.
In Hirota v. MacArthur, the Supreme Court declined to grant leave to file
habeas petitions to two Japanese citizens held in custody by a General of the
United States Army under orders of the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, pursuant to a judgment of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East. 47 The Abu Ali court dismissed
the import of Hirota on the ground that the case only applied to non-citizen
petitioners. However, a straightforward reading of Hirota seems to preclude
the taking of habeas jurisdiction over cases in which the person petitioning for
the writ, whether citizen or not, is held under the authority of a foreign entity. 48
Hirota should perhaps be entitled to little weight. 49 First, the case was
decided at a time when notions of territoriality, rather than citizenship, were

46. Id. at 391-92 (“It was therefore necessary to dismiss the petition insofar as it sought a
writ of habeas corpus, as a court will not issue that writ unless the person who has custody of the
petitioner is within reach of its process.”).
47. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948).
48. Id. at 198 (“stating tersely that [w]e are satisfied that the tribunal sentencing these
petitioners is not a tribunal of the United States,” because it was an “agent of the Allied Powers”);
but see Omar, 479 F.3d at 8 (limiting Hirota to circumstances where habeas petitioner has been
charged with crime by non-U.S. entity or convicted by non-U.S. tribunal); Munaf, 482 F.3d at
583 (acknowledging Omar as controlling authority).
49. See Munaf, 482 F.3d at 584 (“We do not mean to suggest that we find the logic of Hirota
especially clear or compelling, particularly as applied to American citizens.”); Omar, 479 F.3d at
7 (observing that Hirota “articulates no general legal principle at all” and the Supreme Court “has
never cited Hirota for any substantive proposition”).
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much more dispositive of whether courts would imply rights abroad.
Consequently, the Hirota Court may not have discerned a need to focus on the
citizenship of the petitioners, rather than the foreign status of the sentencing
tribunal). 50 Nevertheless, it was the fact that the sovereignty of the United
States did not extend to the tribunal, not the fact that the petitioners were
located on foreign soil that seemed to drive the Hirota majority. Even if the
import of the territoriality principle has since eroded, the Court’s holding
regarding the relevance of the sovereignty of the authority detaining the habeas
petitioner still may be relevant. 51
Second, the Hirota majority opinion was conclusive and offered sparse
legal analysis. Importantly, the majority never distinguished between two
distinct questions: (i) whether the Supreme Court itself had either original or
appellate jurisdiction over the habeas petition and (ii) whether any U.S. court
could exercise jurisdiction over the petition. Justice Douglas’s concurring
opinion analyzed these issues in more depth, and concluded that while the
Supreme Court itself may lack jurisdiction over the case, the appropriate
remedy was to remit the parties to the District Court for the District of
Columbia, which he determined did have jurisdiction. 52 Since the Court went

50. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197
(1903); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)
(“The Insular Cases”). The Insular cases held that certain constitutional rights did not extend to
certain “unincorporated” territories recently acquired by the United States. See Downes, 182 U.S.
at 270 (“The U.S. Constitution does not apply to foreign countries or to trials therein
conducted.”). Reid v. Covert, in holding that the constitution applies to the trial of a United States
citizen by U.S. military authorities in a foreign country for (capital) offenses committed there,
shifted the focus of the constitutional inquiry to citizenship status. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1, 6 (1957) (“When the government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield,
which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide, to protect his life and liberty
should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.”); see also Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 (1950) (“With the citizen we are now little concerned, except to
set his case apart as untouched by this decision and to take measure of the difference between his
status and that of all categories of aliens. Citizenship as a head of jurisdiction and a ground of
protection was old when Paul invoked it in his appeal to Caesar. The years have not destroyed nor
diminished the importance of citizenship nor have they sapped the vitality of a citizen's claims
upon his government for protection.”). Nevertheless, as suggested by United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, territoriality as a determinant of the constitutional protections enjoyed by non-citizens
remains relevant today. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (“[A]liens
receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States
and developed substantial connections with the country.”).
51. See Omar, 479 F.3d at 7 (acknowledging circuit precedent holding that “the critical
factor in Hirota was the petitioners’ convictions by an international tribunal”); see also Munaf,
482 F.3d at 584.
52. Hirota, 338 U.S. at 200 (“I think it is plain that a District Court of the United States does
have jurisdiction to entertain petitions for habeas corpus to examine into the cause of the restraint
of liberty of the petitioners.”).
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directly to the merits, however, Justice Douglas followed suit and objected to
the principle seemingly established by the majority that jurisdiction was barred
by the mere fact that the committing tribunal was international. 53 In Justice
Douglas’s view, the better course would have been to “ascertain whether, so
far as American participation is concerned, there was authority to try the
defendants for the precise crimes with which they are charged.” 54 Ultimately,
Justice Douglas apparently agreed that no United States court had jurisdiction
over the habeas petition on the grounds that “the capture and control of those
who were responsible for the Pearl Harbor incident was a political question on
which the President as Commander-in-Chief, and as spokesman for the nation
in foreign affairs, had the final say.” 55 Nevertheless, despite his final
acquiescence, Justice Douglas expressed concern at the breadth of the
majority’s decision and particularly the apparent applicability of the principles
therein established to the case of an American citizen. 56 For Justice Douglas,
the jurisdictional hook for the Court’s inquiry should have been the
involvement of a United States official in the tribunal; it was a particularly
strong hook on the facts of Hirota, because General MacArthur presumably
had the authority to obtain Hirota’s release if ordered to do so by a superior
officer. 57
As demonstrated by the recent efforts of the D.C. Circuit to grapple with
its significance, 58 Hirota is a more problematic precedent than the Abu Ali
court acknowledged. Nowhere does Hirota distinguish the situation of an alien
from that of a citizen, and indeed the focus of the opinion was on the foreign
nature of the tribunal, despite the fact that the United States exercised control
over the petitioner through General MacArthur. 59 If anything, the fact that the
United States controlled the petitioner in Hirota meant that the circumstances
of that case were more amenable to the assertion of jurisdiction by a United
States court than the circumstances of Abu Ali, in which the foreign entity
holding the petitioner was a sovereign country subject to no official United
States control. Justice Douglas’s Hirota concurrence is certainly more
favorable precedent for the position adopted in Abu Ali. Justice Douglas
indeed strongly intimated that he would have supported review if the petitioner

53. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 205 (1948) (“[W]e sacrifice principle when we stop
our inquiry once we ascertain that the tribunal is international.”).
54. Id. at 205.
55. Id. at 215.
56. See id. at 205 (“I cannot believe that we would adhere to that formula if these petitioners
were American citizens.”).
57. See id. at 207 (“It is [MacArthur] who has custody of petitioners.”).
58. See Omar, 479 F.3d at 1; Munaf, 482 F.3d 582.
59. See Munaf, 482 F.3d at 584 (“Hirota did not suggest any distinction between citizens
and non-citizens . . . .”); but see Omar, 479 F.3d at 6 (interpreting Hirota as confronting issue of
“the availability of habeas to non-citizens convicted abroad by multinational tribunals”).
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had been a United States citizen. Nevertheless, as previously noted, General
MacArthur’s official position as Hirota’s custodian also rendered Hirota a
much stronger case for a determination that there was habeas jurisdiction,
since, even if United States officials directing the Saudis to hold Abu Ali, these
officials would have had no de jure official authority to direct his continued
detention.
C. Implications of Rasul and Padilla for Interpretation of the Habeas Statute
The manner in which Abu Ali distinguished Keefe and Hirota demonstrated
the extent to which it was driven by the mindset of ensuring the triumph of the
principle of judicial review in cases of Executive detention—a principle that,
as noted above, it deemed strongly supported by what it perceived as the clear
narrative of progressively expanding habeas jurisdiction. To the extent that
this mindset drove the court’s expansive reading of the habeas statute, it
problematically trumped the significance of the primary background norm
underlying the seemingly rigid formalism that is still evident in the body of law
governing jurisdiction under the habeas statute—the importance of Executive
discretion to conduct foreign policy, especially during times of war. 60 Abu Ali
purported to address this important consideration in the second half of the
opinion dealing with external constraints on habeas jurisdiction emanating
from the act of state doctrine, separation of powers, and political question
doctrine. However, formalism in interpreting text is itself an inherently
conservative doctrine, and the abandonment of formalism means an
abandonment of important baseline concerns that conservatism helps advance.
By adopting an ends-oriented approach and unmooring interpretation of the

60. See THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982)
("Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those
qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand."); see also John Yoo, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1199 (2004) (“The centralization of authority in the President alone
is particularly crucial in matters of national defense, war, and foreign policy, where a unitary
executive can evaluate threats, consider policy choices, and make command decisions affecting
operations in the field with a speed and energy that is far superior to any other branch.”). The
classic statement with respect to habeas jurisdiction is in Johnson v. Eisentrager:
To grant the writ to these prisoners might mean that our army must transport them across
the seas for hearing. . . .The writ, since it is held to be a matter of right, would be equally
available to enemies during active hostilities as in the present twilight between war and
peace. Such trials would hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy.
They would diminish the prestige of our commanders . . . . It would be difficult to devise
more effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered
to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts
and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home. Nor is it
unlikely that the result of such enemy litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial
and military opinion highly comforting to enemies of the United States.
339 U.S. 763, 778-779 (U.S. 1950).
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habeas statute from its formalistic roots, the Abu Ali court generally
undervalued the importance of those considerations of Executive autonomy
that have historically shaped and limited the expansion of statutory habeas
jurisdiction.
A comparison of the Rasul and Padilla opinions helps to flesh out the core
conflict between ends-oriented and formalistic interpretations of the habeas
statute. The Rasul majority openly was ends-oriented in its approach, tailoring
its reading of the formal statutory rules governing habeas jurisdiction in light
of an overarching concern with the background principle of ensuring judicial
oversight over Executive detentions. The ends-oriented approach of the
opinion is best demonstrated by the majority’s willingness to play relatively
fast and loose with Eisentrager, interpreting its (implicit) statutory holding as
cursory and undeserving of stare decisis effect, 61 and focusing almost entirely
on its constitutional holding that enemy aliens do not have a constitutional
right to bring a habeas petition in United States courts. 62 Having dispensed
with Eisentrager’s statutory implications, the majority was able to read Braden
v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court as establishing a broad exception to the
territoriality requirement when the petitioner is not within the territorial
jurisdiction of the district court and the custodian can be reached by service of
process. 63 Since the habeas statute does not on its face distinguish between
citizens and aliens, 64 and the government conceded that a district court would
have jurisdiction over a habeas petition brought by a United States citizen
detained in Guantanamo 65 (thus eviscerating the government’s own argument
that statutes should not be read to apply extra-territorially), 66 the majority was

61. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474 (2004) (“The Court had far less to say on the
question of the petitioners' statutory entitlement to habeas review. Its only statement on the
subject was a passing reference to the absence of statutory authorization: ‘Nothing in the text of
the Constitution extends such a right, nor does anything in our statutes.’”).
62. See id. at 474 (observing that in its review of the decision of the court of appeals, the
Supreme Court in Eisentrager “proceeded from the premise that ‘nothing in our statutes’
conferred federal-court jurisdiction, and accordingly evaluated the Court of Appeals' resort to
‘fundamentals’ on its own terms”).
63. See id. at 475 (“Braden thus established that Ahrens can no longer be viewed as
establishing ‘an inflexible jurisdictional rule,’ and is strictly relevant only to the question of the
appropriate forum, not to whether the claim can be heard at all.”).
64. See id. at 476 (“there is little reason to think that Congress intended the geographical
coverage of the statute to vary depending on the detainee’s citizenship”).
65. See id. at 476 (“Respondents themselves concede that the habeas statute would create
federal-court jurisdiction over the claims of an American citizen held at the base.”) (citing
Transcript of Oral Arguments at 27).
66. As discussed in the majority opinion, during oral argument, the government observed
that Eisentrager had much high-flown language about citizenship suggesting that the court’s
analysis as applied to a citizen would likely reach a different result. See Transcript of Oral
Argument 28, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466; see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 , 770 (1950)

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

CONCEPTIONS OF THE VESSEL

323

free to conclude that the habeas statute conferred jurisdiction over the
Guantanamo detainees. 67
Furthermore, the majority’s willingness to highlight every possible
distinction between the Eisentrager and Rasul petitioners, despite resting its
holding on a relatively straightforward statutory interpretation and dismissing
Eisentrager’s constitutional holding, further demonstrated the extent to which
the majority was willing to eschew strict doctrine in favor of an ends-oriented
approach. 68 In the initial stages of the opinion, the majority seemed almost to
be explaining why these petitioners deserved habeas review, while the
petitioners in Eisentrager did not, despite the fact that Rasul’s formal holding
seemingly would have accorded no relevance to the Eisentrager factors. 69
Justice Scalia’s dissent took forceful issue both with the majority’s
interpretation of Eisentrager, observing that Eisentrager clearly rested on a
determination that Section 2241 conferred no jurisdiction over the petitioners,
and its broad reading of Braden. 70 More generally, Justice Scalia pointedly
criticized the majority’s abandonment of doctrine and adoption of an endsoriented analysis. 71

(“It is neither sentimentality nor chauvinism to repeat that ‘Citizenship is a high privilege.’”).
Despite the Eisentrager Court’s implication that this is an obvious proposition as a matter of pure
statutory interpretation, see Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770 (observing in discussion of 8 U. S. C. §
903 that “[b]ecause the Government's obligation of protection is correlative with the duty of loyal
support inherent in the citizen's allegiance, Congress has directed the President to exert the full
diplomatic and political power of the United States on behalf of any citizen, but of no other, in
jeopardy abroad.”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 does not admit to such an easy distinction between citizens
and aliens as a matter of straightforward statutory interpretation; nevertheless, federal court
jurisdiction over a citizen is perhaps constitutionally-compelled. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
289, 301 (2001).
67. Rasul, 545 U.S. at 478 (“We therefore hold that § 2241 confers on the district court
jurisdiction to hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.”).
68. See id. at 473 (discussing ways in which Rasul petitioners differ from the Eisentrager
detainees).
69. Justice Kennedy’s constitutionally-grounded concurring opinion, by contrast, rests
squarely on these distinctions between the Rasul and Eisentrager petitioners. Rasul, 542 U.S. at
4481 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In light of the status of Guantanamo Bay and the indefinite
pretrial detention of the detainees, I would hold that federal-court jurisdiction is permitted in these
cases. This approach would avoid creating automatic statutory authority to adjudicate the claims
of persons located outside the United States, and remains true to the (constitutional?) reasoning of
Eisentrager.”) (parentheses added).
70. See id. at 484-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[O]utside that class of cases [in which
petitioner is in custody in multiple jurisdictions] Braden did not question the general rule of
Ahrens (much less that of Eisentrager).”).
71. See id. at 486 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he possibility of one a textual exception
thought to be required by the Constitution is no justification for abandoning the clear application
of the text to a situation in which it raises no constitutional doubt.”).
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By contrast with Rasul’s focus on the end of ensuring the reviewability of
Executive detentions, the majority opinion in Padilla was of a much more
formalist bent, refusing to continue in the context of Padilla’s detention and
subsequent removal to South Carolina, the trend established by Braden, 72
Strait, 73 Endo, 74 Toth, 75 and Burns 76 of gradually eroding the applicability of
the “immediate custodian” rule. 77 The dissent criticized this formalism. It
stressed that the “the Court is forced to acknowledge the numerous exceptions
we have made to the immediate custodian rule,” and that in light of the “far
from bright” nature of that rule, the Court should recognize another exception
since Padilla’s detention was “singular [in creating] . . . a unique and
unprecedented threat to the freedom of every American citizen.” 78
The oscillation between Rasul’s ends-orientation and Padilla’s formalism
suggests that the Court is still unsettled with respect to how broadly to expand
current categories to permit habeas petitioners alleging novel factual situations
to come under the jurisdiction of federal courts. In light of this uncertainty, the
Abu Ali court was perhaps too quick to conclude that, in light of existing case
law and statutory construction, the mere fact that Abu Ali was held in foreign
custody did not preclude habeas as the appropriate remedy.
It is nevertheless worth observing that one final factor supporting the Abu
Ali court’s approach is that, at least when a citizen is detained, constitutional
considerations apply, albeit with unclear scope, to buttress the reading of the
habeas statute as establishing jurisdiction. The opaque case law suggests that
there is some constitutional right to habeas review that Congress cannot
withdraw via a jurisdictional statute. 79 The Abu Ali opinion noted that
“Eisentrager and Rasul counsel at the very least that the habeas statute should
be interpreted expansively to avoid the constitutional question whether a
citizen of the United States would be deprived of his constitutional rights if he
were denied any opportunity whatsoever to challenge the legality of a
72. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
73. Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341 (1972).
74. Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
75. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
76. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
77. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441-442 (2004) (“While Padilla's detention is
undeniably unique in many respects, it is at bottom a simple challenge to physical custody
imposed by the Executive-the traditional core of the Great Writ . . . . His detention is thus not
unique in any way that would provide arguable basis for a departure from the immediate
custodian rule.”).
78. Id.
79. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298-301 (2001) (construing statute at issue narrowly to
avoid potential constitutional issues posed by “answer[ing] the difficult question of what the
Suspension Clause protects”); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (construing jurisdiction
stripping statute narrowly to avoid constitutional issues; Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85 (1869)
(same).
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detention alleged to be at the behest of the executive.” 80 Eisentrager itself
addressed the constitutional problem, stating that “[w]ith the citizen we are
now little concerned, except to set his case apart as untouched by this decision
and to take measure of the difference between his status and that of all
categories of aliens.” 81 In Rasul, Justice Scalia’s dissent picked up on this
dicta from Eisentrager, acknowledging that “[t]he constitutional doubt that the
Court of Appeals in Eisentrager had erroneously attributed to the lack of
habeas for an alien abroad might indeed exist with regard to a citizen abroad
justifying a strained construction of the habeas statute, or (more honestly) a
determination of constitutional right to habeas.” 82
II. EXTERNAL BARS TO HABEAS JURISDICTION
A.

Discussion of the Abu Ali Court’s Treatment of Act of State, Separation of
Powers, and Political Question Doctrine Impediments to the Exercise of
Habeas Jurisdiction
1. Act of state

With the habeas statute interpreted as conferring jurisdiction, the Abu Ali
court nonetheless had to confront three intertwined, yet analytically distinct,
external bars to the assertion of jurisdiction: the act of state doctrine, the
separation of powers, and the political question doctrine. While these analyses
follow three distinct pathways in the case law, they are all ultimately rooted in
conceptions of the separation of powers and the contours of the judiciary’s
proper relationship with the Executive in the foreign affairs realm. Again, the
court’s mindset of preventing unreviewable Executive detention ultimately
predetermined the outcome of these analyses.
The Abu Ali court rejected the government’s act of state objections to the
assertion of jurisdiction over Abu Ali’s petition, relying largely on the
narrowing of the doctrine’s reach signaled by W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v.
Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int’l. 83 In W.S. Kirkpatrick, the Supreme
Court rejected application of the act of state doctrine to the actions of an
American contractor sued in tort by its competitor for allegedly offering bribes
to Nigerian government officials. 84 Based on W.S. Kirkpatrick, the Abu Ali
court concluded that the act of state doctrine can bar judicial inquiry only when
the “validity” or “legality” of the foreign act is in question, and therefore

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 54 (2004).
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 (1950).
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 486 (2004).
493 U.S. 400 (1990).
Id.
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dismissed the government’s argument that the inquiry and relief requested by
Abu Ali would “embarrass” the Saudis. 85
While the Abu Ali court’s act of state doctrine analysis constituted a
defensible, mechanical application of W.S. Kirkpatrick, it is nonetheless
problematic. Specifically, the Abu Ali court equated the question of whether
the United States “obtain[ed]” Abu Ali’s detention with the much simpler
question of whether it demanded his detention, thus permitting it to analogize
the inquiry in Abu Ali to that in W.S. Kirkpatrick of whether the Nigerian
officials “demanded and accepted a bribe.” 86 But the inquiries are in fact very
different: resolution of the W.S. Kirkpatrick issue required determination of a
straightforward factual issue, whether the bribe was demanded and accepted;
whereas, resolution of the Abu Ali issue would require determination of
whether a sovereign government possessed any independent motivation for the
decision to detain an individual. Demonstrating a negative answer, that the
Saudis had no independent motivation is inherently problematic because a
finding that American officials played a major role in prodding the Saudis to
detain Abu Ali would presumably not be dispositive in the absence of an
additional finding that the Saudis had no other legitimate reason to detain him.
The Saudis likely had multiple motives for detaining Abu Ali, inter alia, their
own suspicions regarding his possible involvement in Saudi criminal activity
related to the 2003 Riyadh bombings and the desire to placate a powerful
patron state. 87
Adjudication of Abu Ali’s habeas petition and an ultimate decision on the
merits in his favor would have to eviscerate completely the possibility of any
independent Saudi motive for Abu Ali’s detention; such a determination would
verge on one regarding the “validity” of the actions of a sovereign government,
thus bringing it within the ambit of core act of state concerns. 88 Thus, the Abu

85. See Abu Ali, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (“The ‘validity’ or ‘legality’ of the Saudi detention is
not at issue; rather, the issue is whether the United States ran afoul of its constitutional
obligations to Abu Ali in ‘obtaining’ the detention from the Saudis.”); see also W.S. Kirkpatrick,
493 U.S. at 407-408. The court notes further that invocation of the act of state doctrine is
particularly suspect when employed by the United States to shield itself from inquiry into “its
own allegedly unconstitutional acts against one of its citizens.” See Abu Ali, 350 F. Supp. 2d at
60 (“Whatever limited bearing the act of state doctrine has on this case in light of the above
analysis is only diminished further by the fact that the doctrine is being invoked here by the
United States in an attempt to shield itself from judicial inquiry for its own allegedly
unconstitutional acts against one of its citizens.”).
86. Abu Ali, 350 F. Supp. 2d 59-60 (quoting W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 408).
87. See Caryle Murphy & John Mintz, Virginia Man’s Months in Saudi Prison Go
Unexplained, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2003, at A01.
88. Thus perhaps rendering the inquiry here analogous to that in Underhill v. Hernandez,
where the Supreme Court held the act of state doctrine barred inquiry into the actions of the
Venezuelan revolutionary government, which refused to allow an America contractor to leave the
city of Bolivar. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (“Every sovereign State is
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Ali court’s analysis surely downplayed the extent to which further judicial
proceedings would require a highly intrusive inquiry into official Saudi policy
and the motivations of Saudi officials. Tellingly, the Abu Ali court recognized
that the resolution of Abu Ali’s petition in his favor would likely raise act of
state concerns, but it deemed such concerns sufficiently distant to be ignored at
the motion to dismiss stage. 89
2. Political question and separation of powers
The Abu Ali court’s determination that neither the political question
doctrine nor the separation of powers barred the assertion of jurisdiction over
Abu Ali’s habeas petition followed two main lines of argument. First, while
the court observed generally that Executive decision-making in the foreign
affairs arena enjoys wide insulation from judicial review, it distinguished
between suits challenging the Executive’s exercise of foreign affairs powers
and those alleging that the Executive violated the constitutional rights of a
citizen in the making of a foreign affairs decision. 90 The Abu Ali court also
asserted broadly that neither separation of powers considerations nor the
political question doctrine could bar judicial review of allegations that
Executive action in the foreign affairs realm resulted in the violation of a
citizen’s constitutional rights, particularly the right to freedom from unlawful
detention. 91
Second, in its separation of powers discussion, the Abu Ali court focused
specifically on judicial competence to conduct the type of inquiry necessary to
resolve the legality of Abu Ali’s detention. As the court noted, the simple fact

bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.”).
89. See Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (D.C Cir. 2004) (“The closer the case
drifts to instructions the United States government - either the judiciary or the executive must
provide to the Saudi government about a legal act of the Saudi government (arrest or otherwise),
the more that act of state concerns will build.”).
90. See Abu Ali, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 61 (citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
588-89 (1952) (“The Supreme Court has instructed that matters ‘vitally and intricately interwoven
with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations . . . are so exclusively
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference.’”)).
91. See id. at 61-62 (“There is simply no authority or precedent, however, for respondents’
suggestion that the executive's prerogative over foreign affairs can overwhelm to the point of
extinction the basic constitutional rights of citizens of the United States to freedom from unlawful
detention by the executive. The competing interests of the executive to manage foreign affairs
and the judiciary to protect the due process rights of citizens has never been resolved wholly in
the executive's favor.”); id . at 64 (“Here, petitioners challenge not the failure of the United States
to act on behalf of a citizen in accordance with certain claimed statutory duties, but the United
States’ alleged actions against a citizen in violation of certain constitutional duties. In this setting,
even these cases hold, the political question doctrine wanes.”).
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of foreign participation in allegedly unconstitutional conduct does not, in and
of itself, insulate that conduct from judicial review. 92 The court rested this
proposition on the line of cases under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
permitting judicial review of allegations that foreign agents acting at the behest
of the United States government unconstitutionally obtained evidence for use
in a subsequent criminal trial. 93
At this point, it is worthwhile to step back from the individual act of state,
separation of powers, and political question doctrine analyses, and consider the
extent to which they really constitute the same analysis under different guises.
As Professor Tribe has observed, constitutional, 94 prudential, 95 and
functional 96 rationales underlie the political question doctrine. 97
Consequently, considerations of the separation of powers, desirable judicial
restraint, and relative institutional capacity motivate its invocation. 98 More
generally, the political question doctrine inquiry, for Professor Tribe, is
primarily concerned with “whether particular constitutional provisions yield
judicially enforceable rights.” 99 This definition is useful because it permits
focus on the “rights” and the “judicially enforceable” portions of the analysis,
both of which are necessary for a court appropriately to assert jurisdiction. In
cases, such as Abu Ali, that raise the question of the extent courts can review
Executive action in the foreign affairs realm when that action clearly impinges
on individual rights, the inquiry is simplified in Professor Tribe’s framework to
the question of judicial enforceability. And this judicial enforceability analysis
is really primarily a species of the separation of powers inquiry, since concerns
about the desirability of judicial restraint and judicial competence become
substantially less acute when individual rights are involved, thus leaving solely
the constitutional, i.e., separation of powers, rationale for invocation of the
political question doctrine. 100 In such circumstances, the political question

92. See id. at 63-64 (quoting Resp. Order to Show Cause at 19-20 (asserting that inquiries
involving the courts “in matters of the most delicate diplomacy” are not unusual for the courts)).
93. See id. at 63 (citing to United States v. Karake, 281 F. Supp. 2d 302, 308 (D.D.C.
2003)); see also United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 145 (2d Cir. 2003).
94. The separation of powers generally, and more specifically, textual commitment to a
coordinate branch.
95. The desirability of avoiding unnecessary inter-branch conflict
96. The lack of judicially-manageable standards.
97. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-16, at 366 (2000).
98. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 14 (4th ed. 1983).
99. TRIBE, supra note 97, at 366.
100. Considerations of judicial restraint are very relevant, however, when individual rights are
not directly threatened, as in situations of inter-branch conflict. The outcome of the separation of
powers and political question doctrine inquiries can diverge in cases presenting such conflict, if
political question doctrine considerations counsel judicial abstention but separation of powers
considerations counsel resolution of the conflict on the merits in favor of one of the coordinate
branches. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (with plurality opinion refusing to
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doctrine becomes the judicial response to cases that pose separation of powers
impediments of such import as to compel the conclusion that individual rights
are not judicially enforceable because resolution of the matter is textually
committed to one of the political branches. 101 As for the act of state doctrine,
it is really just a manifestation of the political question doctrine in one
particular setting. 102 Indeed, the markedly similar approaches adopted by the
Abu Ali court in its formal consideration of these three doctrines suggests their
closely intertwined nature, as well the impact of the Abu Ali court’s own
overarching mindset in approaching them.
B.

Evaluation of the Abu Ali Court’s Analysis of Separation of Powers
Barriers to Jurisdiction

Assessment of the soundness of the Abu Ali court’s analyses of the
separation of powers and political question doctrine impediments to its
exercise of jurisdiction is complicated by the vagueness and indeterminacy of
Supreme Court case law assessing when foreign affairs issues are too political
adjudicate role of Senate in treaty abrogation process on political question grounds while dissent
favors merits determination holding that power to abrogate treaty is within sole control of
Executive).
101. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (stressing importance of the
Senate’s “sole” power to try impeachments in holding that political question doctrine barred
judicial resolution of challenge by federal judge to Senate’s use of committee to hear testimony
and gather evidence in his impeachment trial); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 4, 10 (1973)
(concluding that political question doctrine barred inquiry into whether there was “a pattern of
training, weaponry and orders in the Ohio National Guard which [made] inevitable the
unnecessary use of fatal force in suppressing civilian disorders,” on basis that “it would be
difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental action that was intended by the
Constitution to be left to the political branches”); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 5 (1972) (staying
court of appeals’ judgment holding that recommendations of Credentials Committee of
Democratic National Convention regarding seating of delegates violated constitution, “in light of
the availability of the Convention as a forum to review the recommendations of the Credentials
Committee . . . the lack of precedent to support the extraordinary relief granted by the Court of
Appeals, and the large public interest in allowing the political process to function free from
judicial supervision”); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Guaranteeing a Republican Form of
Government: Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV.
849, 858, 866 n.67 (1994) (critiquing Morgan because “[b]y deeming the case to be a political
question, the Court left a constitutional violation would be left entirely ignored and unremedied,”
noting that O’Brien is a case pertaining to an individual delegate’s constitutional right to be
seated, and observing that Nixon, while ostensibly about structural distribution of governmental
power, was also fundamentally about an individual’s right to be impeached in conformity with
the Constitution).
102. See TRIBE, supra note 97, at 373 n.44 (arguing that Justice Harlan’s opinion in
Sabbatino paralleled Tribe’s own political question doctrine approach of asking whether “a
federal court could formulate standards of law appropriate for judicial application,” and reading
W.S. Kirkpatrick as merely affirming that the political question doctrine is not free form and
impressionistic, but “a narrowly cabined legal principal”).
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for judicial resolution. 103 Certainly, a baseline of significant Executive
autonomy in this area is well established. 104 The case for Executive autonomy
is especially strong with respect to potential judicial intrusions, since on both
formal constitutional and policy grounds, Congress has a much stronger claim
than the judiciary to authority in the foreign affairs realm. 105 Nevertheless, it is

103. The Supreme Court has only decided two foreign affairs cases on political question
grounds since the enumeration of the modern Political Question doctrine in Baker v. Carr. See
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (refusing to adjudicate the question of whether the
Executive possessed sole authority to abrogate an extant treaty); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1
(1973) (refusing to adjudicate the comportment of the training of the Ohio National Guard with
the Fourteenth Amendment on the grounds that “[t]he complex, subtle, and professional decisions
as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essential
professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and
Executive branches”). Professor Rachel Barkow attributes the doctrine’s decline to the Supreme
Court’s having become “increasingly blind to its limitations as an institution.” Rachel Barkow,
More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial
Lower courts, however, have
Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 268 n.158 (2002).
continued to apply the doctrine “with some frequency” in cases involving foreign affairs. Id. at
301.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)
(“[P]articipation in the exercise of the [foreign affairs] power is significantly limited. In this vast
external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate, and manifold problems, the president
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.”); see also Haig v. Agee,
453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981) (“Matters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are
rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention.”); Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (“[T]he very nature of executive decisions as to
foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions . . . are delicate, complex, and involve
large elements of prophecy . . . They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither
aptitude, facilities, nor responsibility . . . .”).
105. See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (“The
political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve
around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the
halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.”); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 582 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Congress, to be sure, has a substantial and
essential role in both foreign affairs and national security. But it is crucial to recognize that
judicial interference in these domains destroys the purpose of vesting primary responsibility in a
unitary executive.”); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952) (“matters vitally and
intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations
. . . are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune
from judicial inquiry or interference"); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1942)
(reading United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), as holding that “the conduct of foreign
relations is committed by the Constitution to the political departments of the Federal
Government” and “the propriety of the exercise of that power is not open to judicial inquiry”);
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) ("[T]he conduct of the foreign relations
of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative departments–
the political departments–of the government and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decisions.") (internal
quotations omitted).
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inherent in the American constitutional system that constitutional strictures
necessarily dictate the freedom of action of any branch, and the federal
judiciary may not engage in a “free form, impressionistic version of
abstention.” 106 The role of the federal judiciary is particularly important when
the Executive threatens individual rights. 107
In light of these principles, the Abu Ali court properly distinguished
between its own inquiry and those political question doctrine cases refusing to
adjudicate the alleged failure of the Executive to comport with statutory
provisions constraining its discretion. 108 The Abu Ali court was surely correct
in asserting that courts have a responsibility to probe Executive rationales and
if necessary intervene to protect individual rights. However, courts may not
abdicate the judicial oversight function merely because the Executive asserts
that its actions fall within the foreign affairs power.
In its dual focus on the importance of judicial review for foreign affairs
issues that touch directly on individual rights and the relative competence of
the judiciary to conduct such inquiries, the Abu Ali court’s orientation displays
strong elements of what Professor Nzelibe has called the “balance of
institutional competencies” approach to assertions of unreviewability by the
Executive in the area of foreign affairs. 109 In the context of cases alleging that
Executive foreign affairs decisions have infringed on individual rights, the

106. TRIBE, supra note 97, at 637 (§ 4-3); see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (“[I]t
is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond
judicial cognizance.”); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2785 (2006) (declining to
defer to president’s claim of “military necessity”).
107. See Comm. of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (“The Executive’s power to conduct foreign relations free from the unwarranted
supervision of the Judiciary cannot give the Executive carte blanche to trample the most
fundamental liberty and property rights of this country’s citizenry.”); see also Ruth Wedgwood,
The Uncertain Career of Executive Power, 25 Yale J. Int'l L. 310, 313 (2000) ("The
constitutionally protected entitlements of citizens, in liberty and property, may sharply limit the
domain of presidential foreign affairs powers.").
108. See Abu Ali, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 64 (distinguishing Smith v. Reagan, 844 F.2d 195, 197
(4th Cir. 1988), a case brought against the Executive to force him per terms of Hostage Act, 22
U.S.C. § 1732 (1982), to “obtain an accounting from Vietnam of the status of United States
veterans of the Vietnam War,” which was dismissed on political question grounds).
109. Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941, 975 (2004)
(“[A] balance of institutional competencies model envisions that when faced with a foreign affairs
controversy, the courts weigh their institutional advantage in resolving certain kinds of disputes
against that of the political branches before deciding on the appropriate amount of deference to
accord the political branches' judgments.”); see also TRIBE, supra note 97, at 366 (§ 3-13) (citing
Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE
L.J. 517, 566-82 (1966) (describing “functional” approach to political question doctrine as
concerned with factors that include “difficulties in gaining judicial access to relevant information,
the need for uniformity of decision, and the wider responsibilities of the other branches of
government”)).
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institutional competencies approach dictates that courts are to (i) take
jurisdiction over such cases and (ii) balance the particular foreign policy
against the individual rights asserted, with an appropriate level of deference
accorded the judgment of the political branches in light of their “comparative
institutional competence over foreign affairs issues.” 110 Professor Nzelibe
observes that in the wake of September 11th, courts have implicitly adopted
such an approach of “jurisdiction plus deference.” 111 As seemingly did the
Abu Ali court, which in addition to its strong pronouncements regarding the
necessity of asserting jurisdiction, also made clear that the Executive would be
accorded substantial deference as the inquiry progressed. 112
However, an approach rooted in relative institutional competencies is only
appropriate, even when individual rights are involved, if the Constitution does
not clearly commit authority to a coordinate branch. Certainly, courts should
be very reticent to find such a textual commitment when individual rights are
at stake; nevertheless, despite the presumption of reviewability, courts cannot
assert jurisdiction over those cases that turn on foreign affairs decisions that
are clearly and necessarily within the un-reviewable purview of the Executive.
C. The Abu Ali Court Does Not Sufficiently Consider Separation of Powers
Concerns Related to the Remedy
The Abu Ali court erred in analyzing at too broad a level of generalization
the potential obstacles to judicial review posed by Abu Ali’s detention;
specifically, the court only addressed (and dismissed) the threshold obstacles to
judicial review, and never engaged with the more vexing separation of powers
problems posed by the fact of foreign control over Abu Ali. The crucial
distinction complicating the analysis is that between the president as foreign
policy-maker and communicator. Then-congressman John Marshall observed
that “[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and
its sole representative with foreign nations;” this statement implied at a
minimum that the President constitutes the sole “instrument of communication
with other governments.” 113 As Professor Tribe observed, the sum of the
Executive’s enumerated foreign policy powers in Article II, combined with the
Take Care Clause, “have come to be regarded as explicit textual manifestations

110. Nzelibe, supra note 109, at 1005.
111. Id. at 1006.
112. See Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 63 (2004) (“The deference due the
executive in the management of foreign relations will limit any discovery that will occur and will
narrow the Court's inquiry.”).
113. EDWARD CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, 177-78 (1957);
see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) ("In th[e] vast
external realm [of foreign affairs] . . . . the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation.").
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of the inherent presidential power to administer, if not necessarily to formulate
in any autonomous sense, the foreign policy of the United States.” 114 More
specifically, the Article II, Section 3 power to receive Ambassadors, 115
interpreted by most commentators as conferring upon the Executive a
recognition power that is effectively immune from congressional regulation, 116
a fortiori commits to sole Executive discretion the power to merely
communicate with foreign nations. Thus, one seeming implication of the
Executive as sole foreign policy communicator is an absolute rule that courts
cannot direct the Executive to direct specific communications at foreign
governments. 117
Although it considered the extent to which inquiry into Abu Ali’s detention
would impinge on the Executive’s role as foreign policy-maker, the Abu Ali
court failed to address adequately the extent to which any remedy that would
follow an on the merits determination in Abu Ali’s favor would intrude on the
Executive’s role as foreign policy communicator. 118 This constituted an undervaluation of the justiciability impediments posed by the case. As analysis of
Gilligan v. Morgan, 119 one of only two post-Baker Supreme Court cases
holding the political question to bar adjudication on the merits, reveals courts
must be attuned to whether the remedial phase of judicial intervention raises
justiciability concerns distinct from those raised by mere judicial inquiry.
The plaintiffs in Gilligan alleged that Ohio National Guard troops violated
their rights of speech and assembly during the Kent State demonstrations, and
that these violations were in part due to the training of, arming of, and orders
114. See TRIBE, supra note 97, § 4-3, at 638; see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,
242 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("In our dealings with the outside world, the United
States speaks with one voice and acts as one.”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 164
(1803) (“[T]he commencement of diplomatic negotiations with a foreign power is completely in
the discretion of the President and the head of the Department of State, who is his political agent.
The Executive is not subject to judicial control or direction in such matters.”).
115. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
116. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 42-43,
88 (2d ed. 1996).
117. See Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“This country's interests in
regard to foreign affairs and international agreements may depend on the symbolic significance to
other countries of various stances and on what is practical with regard to diplomatic interaction
and negotiation. Courts are not in a position to exercise a judgment that is fully sensitive to these
matters”). However, the Adams court is reluctant to state the rule in absolute terms, speculating
that, “while we do not determine the justiciability of a request for relief of this kind, we think it
clear that if such a request is justiciable, the party seeking this kind of relief would have to make
an extraordinarily strong showing to succeed.” Id.
118. The court’s attitude was that the problem could be addressed as the case took its course.
See Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 65 (D.D.C. 2004) (“[B]earing respondents' concerns
founded in the principles of the political question, separation of powers, and act of state doctrines
firmly in mind, the Court will carefully construct the future course of this proceeding.”).
119. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
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issued to the National Guard. 120 Once the case reached the Supreme Court, the
plaintiffs did not contest the procedures currently in place, which had been
changed in the wake of Kent State, but requested a remedy of “continuing
judicial surveillance . . . to assure compliance with [the changed standards].” 121
The Gilligan Court, noting that Art. I, § 8, cl. 16 of the Constitution vests
responsibility for the “militia” in Congress, 122 concluded that “[t]he relief
sought by respondents, requiring initial judicial review and continuing
surveillance by a federal court over the training, weaponry, and orders of the
Guard, would therefore embrace critical areas of responsibility vested by the
Constitution in the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government.” 123
The Court reserved the question of whether inquiry into the National Guard’s
training, weaponry, and orders would ever be acceptable. 124 Revealingly,
however, in the Court’s review of potential official immunity barriers to
subsequent lawsuits seeking damages for the same set of events, it did not
mention any separation of powers impediments to such a remedy. 125
As a case involving an asserted violation of individual rights, Gilligan falls
within the category of cases impinging on the Executive’s foreign affairs
power that should receive the most searching judicial review. It nonetheless
demonstrates the point that at least in the military, and by analogy, foreign
affairs arena, even if a constitutional provision delegating authority to a
specific coordinate branch does not preclude judicial inquiry into the manner in
which that branch exercises its delegated authority, such a clear delegation
may preclude judicial remediation in which a court directs the branch to act in
a certain manner. 126

120. Id. at 3.
121. Id. at 6.
122. The Constitution Art. I, § 8, cl. 16 “vests in Congress the power to provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be
employed in the Service of the United States.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
123. Id. at 7.
124. Id. at 11-12.
125. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
126. The Seventh Circuit adopted a similar rule in Flynn v. Schultz, a case in which the
relatives of a man imprisoned in Mexico sought to compel pursuant to the Hostage Act, 22
U.S.C.S. § 1732, testimony by a State Department official who had attended a number of
meetings between Mexican officials and the imprisoned individual–holding that “[w]ith regard to
an order directing the [United States] to request reasons for a [] citizen's detention abroad or an
order directing that a particular act be undertaken as necessary and proper to obtain the release of
a United States citizen (here the authorization of testimony), such relief would impermissibly
interfere with the Executive's discretion to conduct foreign affairs and would, consequently, be
inconsistent with the political question doctrine.” Flynn v. Schultz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1994 (7th Cir.
1986). The Flynn court did, however, further hold that “enforcement of a duty of inquiry [into
the detention] does not interfere with the President's conduct of foreign relations, nor does . . .
review of the extent of the inquiry implicate standards that are beyond judicial management or
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While the Abu Ali court was not oblivious to the significant remedial
impediments imposed by foreign control over Abu Ali, it accorded them little
weight except to note that they would of necessity impact the course of further
proceedings. 127 For example, in discussing potential separation of powers
objections to the assertion of jurisdiction, the court favorably cited to Ramirez
de Arellano v. Weinberger, a case in which a United States citizen residing in
Honduras sued the United States government for its continuing role in the
destruction and ongoing occupation and utilization of his cattle ranch as a
military base. 128 The Abu Ali court focused on two aspects of the Ramirez de
Arellano opinion: the Ramirez de Arellano court’s reasoning that joint
operations with foreign militaries could not “exculpate officials of the United
States from liability to United States citizens for the United States officials’
unlawful acts,” and its focus on the increasing willingness of the judiciary to
scrutinize Executive conduct in the realm of foreign affairs when “United
States citizens assert constitutional violations by United States officials.” 129

discovery.” Id. at 1195. Judge Tamm’s dissent in Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, a case in
which the plaintiff, a United States citizen who owned a cattle ranch in Honduras, sought, inter
alia, injunctive relief preventing the United States Government from using his land as a military
training facility for Salvadoran soldiers, also makes the point. Ramirez de Arellano v.
Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (vacated and remanded because of
subsequent legislation, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985)) (Tamm, J., dissenting). As Judge Tamm observes,
“[i]mpermissible judicial encroachment upon the power of the political branches can occur not
only from the act of resolving a question whose nature is political, but also from the
consequences that flow from judicial action. . . . Just as a court must refrain from resolving a
question whose nature is political, so must it refrain from adjudicating a claim where the relief
sought would intrude on the independence of the political branches.” Id. In other words, “[t]o
focus only on the narrow issue immediately presented for review . . . overlooks the serious
intrusion on the conduct of foreign policy that will result from granting the requested relief.” Id.
at 1547-48; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962) (referring to “the possible
consequences of judicial action" as one factor informing the political question doctrine analysis);
Thomas W. Merrill, Marbury v. Madison as the First Great Administrative Law Decision, 37
JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 481, 493 (2004) (asserting that “whether the court has a realistic way to
enforce any judgment it would render” is one consideration informing the political question
doctrine analysis).
127. See Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 64 n.36, 65 (2004) (“Act of state and
separation of powers considerations may bear strongly on the nature of the relief that petitioners
will be able to obtain in this action. . . . [A]lthough this case will proceed in the shadow of the
political question doctrine, the right of Abu Ali to challenge his alleged detention at the behest of
the executive will not be eliminated altogether by the doctrine.”). This willingness to defer
consideration of potentially vexing justiciability obstacles is particularly notable given the clear
concerns regarding such issues that the same judge intimated in issuing a memorandum opinion
denying Abu Ali’s request for a preliminary injunction. See Abu Ali, Memorandum opinion at 13
(D.D.C. 2004) (“The court declines to tell the Executive what it may and may not ‘pressure’ its
ally to do in this case.”).
128. See Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 50, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
129. Id. at 50, 62.
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The Abu Ali court then concluded, “[o]f course, the alleged ‘excesses’ are even
greater here than they were in Ramirez de Arellano.” 130
Because of its overall mindset, the Abu Ali court focused on the
overarching principle expounded by Ramirez de Arellano: the United States
cannot insulate itself from judicial review merely by teaming up with foreign
agents or claiming that it is acting in its foreign affairs capacity. 131 In so
doing, the Abu Ali court downplayed the two crucial differences between its
circumstances and those in Ramirez de Arellano, even assuming acceptance of
the soundness of the Ramirez de Arellano majority’s reasoning: (i) According
to the allegations in Ramirez de Arellano, United States officials were directly
responsible for the unconstitutional land occupation; by contrast, according to
Abu Ali’s allegations, it was the Saudis who were actually holding him,
whatever the ultimate control exercised by United States officials; and (ii) the
relief prayed for in Ramirez de Arellano was injunctive and declaratory relief
that, however it might incidentally impinge on United States foreign policy
interests, was both clear in nature and in effect and presumably relatively
easily administered by the court. 132 The provision of injunctive relief for the
ongoing violations allegedly committed by United States officials in such a
situation poses few problems for a court and is within the core judicial
competence: The court simply tells the American officials to get off the land
and observes if they comply. 133 As discussed below, the habeas remedy for a
U.S. citizen detained by a foreign power poses much more vexing problems
largely unacknowledged by the Abu Ali court. 134
130. Id. at 62.
131. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan forcefully reiterated the proposition
that the Executive cannot employ the foreign affairs power without limit. See Hamdan, 126 S.Ct.
2749 (2006).
132. The majority asserts that: “The case does not raise the specter of judicial control and
management of United States foreign policy.” Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d
1500, 1513 (1984). That the majority felt the need to assert this is instructive, even if the claim
itself is dubious. Id. As Judge Tamm observed in his dissent, while the plaintiffs aver–and the
majority opinion agrees–that they are not challenging United States military operations in
Honduras, but rather simply the occupation of the land in question, any relief granted would of
necessity “halt[] the operation of a United States military facility in Central America, at least for a
time.” Id. at 1548 (Tamm, J., dissenting). Judge Tamm concludes that “[i]n this case, the
injunctive relief sought would directly limit the Executive's discretion in conducting military
affairs and diplomatic relations in Honduras.” Id. at 1549. The lesson may be that courts will
constrain to interpret cases implicating individual rights as not calling into question core
Executive competencies in the realm of foreign affairs, but such avoidance must have limits.
133. See Ramirez de Arellano, 745 F.2d at 1512 (terming the resolution of a land dispute a
“paradigmatic issue for resolution by the Judiciary”).
134. See infra Part III.A. The Ramirez de Arellano case is particularly instructive because its
procedural history highlights how subtle remedial differences can determine whether a case is
justiciable. After a Supreme Court vacatur and remand, the case reappeared before the D.C.
Court of Appeals; in the interim, United States troops and structures had been withdrawn from the
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The implications of the inquiry/remedy distinction are further highlighted
by the Abu Ali court’s discussion of those cases in which courts ruling upon
motions to exclude evidence under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments have
inquired into whether United States officials are exercising control over
foreign agents engaging in behaviors that would be unconstitutional if
undertaken by United States government officials. 135 Whatever the similarities
between the inquiries in those cases and the inquiry in Abu Ali, the remedial
ends are different. Violations of the privilege against self-incrimination
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment are remedied by exclusion of the evidence
at trial. 136 Violations of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable
search and seizure are also remedied by exclusion of the evidence at trial, and
may further establish a cause of action for damages against the officers who
conducted the unlawful search. 137 Unlike the case with any prospective habeas
relief, the remedies–particularly the exclusion of evidence–in the Fourth and

military base. In dismissing the case on the ground that equitable relief would no longer be
effective, the court observes that “the continued presence of U.S.-constructed facilities . . .
provides no grounds for injunctive relief, and that [p]laintiffs never sought, nor could we issue, an
injunction against the Honduran Government or its agents to remove Honduran military structures
from Honduran land.” Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 788 F.2d 762, 764 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (on remand) (emphasis added). The remedy of removal of Honduran military structures–
the presence of which, to the extent that they were placed there at the behest of the United States,
constituted on ongoing due process violation traceable to United States conduct–is arguably more
akin to the habeas remedy for a United States citizen detained by a foreign power than the
original Ramirez de Arellano remedy that the Abu Ali court found compellingly analogous,
namely, injunctive relief for ongoing violations committed by United States officials actively
running a military training camp on a United States citizen’s private land.
135. See Abu Ali, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 51 (citing to United States v. Karake, 281 F. Supp. 2d
302, 308 (D.D.C. 2003); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 155 (D.D.C.
1976)).
136. See Miranda v. Arizon, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d
56, 145 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that under the “joint venture doctrine,” “statements elicited
during overseas interrogation by foreign police in the absence of Miranda warnings must be
suppressed whenever United States law enforcement agents actively participate in questioning
conducted by foreign authorities”).
137. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355 n.10 (1974). However, it is unclear
whether a United States citizen could bring a suit for damages (“Bivens action”) alleging violation
of his Fourth Amendment rights by foreign agents acting at the behest of the United States.
Compare Di Lorenzo v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (recognizing Fourth
Amendment Bivens claim for an escaped federal prisoner kidnapped by Panamanian authorities
and shipped back to the United States at the behest of the United States government), with United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 292 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that Bivens itself
precluded damages suits for violations of the Fourth Amendment where there are "special
factors counseling hesitation,” and arguing that a court will only be able to determine the
constitutionality of an overseas search or seizure in cases implicating United States foreign policy
if the Executive decides to bring a criminal prosecution and introduce the evidence seized
abroad).
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Fifth Amendment contexts do not require further judicial interference with the
foreign affairs power of the Executive. 138
III. THE HABEAS REMEDY AND CONCEPTIONS OF THE JUDICIARY
A.

Separation of Powers, Political Question Doctrine, and Standing
Concerns Posed by the Habeas Remedy

Since any order directing the release of a habeas petitioner in a
predicament such as that faced by Abu Ali would have to issue in habeas, 139
the potential justiciability impediments to intervention on such a petitioner’s
behalf require analysis of the unique aspects of the habeas remedy. In his
dissent in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice Scalia observed that “due process rights
have historically been vindicated by the writ of habeas corpus”; 140 this
observation suggests that Justice Scalia conceives of the intersection of habeas
with due process protections as creating a system in which “detention, to be
lawful, must comport with due process (or with the Constitution generally),
and habeas corpus provides a judicial remedy through which inquiry into
constitutionality can be made.” 141
The distinction between rights, the contents of which the due process
clause supplies, and remedies, which the “vessel” of habeas supplies, is a
useful framework for analyzing the problems posed by the habeas remedy in
the Abu Ali context. Habeas has traditionally been available “only to effect
petitioner’s discharge from custody,” a limitation that “is inferred from the
statutory requirement that the habeas petitioner be in custody in violation of

138. Cf. Abu Ali, memorandum opinion at 10 (D.D.C. 2004) (“[G]iven the alleged
involvement of FBI officials in Abu Ali's interrogation, or petitioner's hypothesized subservience
of Saudi authorities to the United States regarding his prosecution, it is arguable that, under these
cases, the exclusionary rule might be invoked.”).
139. In cursorily confronting the above problem, see supra notes 35-38, the Keefe court
concluded that since the petitioner had “alleged that the Secretary of State can, 'by representations
to the Government of France,' obtain Keefe's release,” and had requested “such other and further
relief as to the Court may seem just and proper,” what he was really requesting was a writ of
mandamus. United States ex rel. Keefe v. Dulles, 222 F.2d 390, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The Abu
Ali court explicitly (and correctly) rejected Abu Ali’s petition for a writ of mandamus. See Abu
Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 65-67 (D.D.C. 2004).
140. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 557 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 68 (5th ed. Supp. 2005) [hereinafter FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART &
WECHSLER’S]; but see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (stating that “[a]lthough in form the
Great Writ is simply a mode of procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined with the growth
of fundamental rights of personal liberty,” and thus suggesting that habeas corpus has a
substantive component that goes beyond its function as a remedial vehicle).
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federal law.” 142 If the court’s inquiry determines that the custody is unlawful,
“[the custody] must be invalidated and the petitioner must consequently be
released from its restraints.” 143 The writ is not directed to the petitioner, but
rather to his jailer, who is then obliged to release the petitioner. 144
An order commanding the release of a habeas petitioner detained by an
overseas government obviously could not go to his immediate custodian or that
custodian’s superior, since the immediate custodian and his de facto superiors
would be foreign. 145 The prospect of “invalidating” the custody and ensuring
the petitioner’s discharge would thus have to surmount the problem of eliciting
action from a foreign sovereign state merely because a United States court has
commanded it. The most likely plausible judicial relief would be an order
commanding the Secretary of State to take some action to elicit the petitioner’s
release.
Such relief raises serious questions as to whether a petitioner held by a
foreign government has constitutional standing to bring suit in a United States
court. It is well-established that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing
separately for each form of relief sought.” 146 A plaintiff does not enjoy
standing merely because he has intense interest in the subject of litigation;147
rather, he must “personally . . . benefit in a tangible way from the court’s

142. Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038 (1970); see
also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (“[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack
by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the
writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”); Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885) (“There
must be actual confinement or the present means of enforcing it.”). Recent case law has
somewhat eroded the presumption that immediate release constitutes the only remedy available to
habeas petitioners by permitting attack on a conviction even though: 1) the petitioner has yet to
begin serving the sentence on that conviction, Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989); and
2) the petitioner has already fully served the sentence, as long as the defendant is "in custody" on
a different conviction and granting relief on the expired sentence could advance the anticipated
release date, Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39, 45-46 (1995). Both exceptions do not erode the
core requirement that a court that finds that a habeas petitioner is being held in illegal present
confinement must direct his release.
143. Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 142.
144. In re Jackson, 15 Mich. 417, 439, 440 (Mich. 1867) (“The officer or person who serves it
does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by
compelling the oppressor to release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the
respondent.”).
145. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 530 (1957) (“A sovereign nation has exclusive
jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders, unless it expressly or
impliedly consents to surrender its jurisdiction.”).
146. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
185 (2000).
147. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 486 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
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intervention.” 148 The redressability prong of standing doctrine bars litigants
from access to the courts when the “hoped for” judicial relief is only
speculatively connected to the injury suffered, 149 particularly when “the relief
require[s] action by a party not before the Court.” 150 The Supreme Court has
suggested that the constitutional standing requirement is rooted in separation of
powers considerations, 151 most relevantly the limited scope of Article III and a
sense of “the proper, and properly limited, role of the courts in a democratic
society.” 152 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 153 the Court further suggested
an Article II basis for the standing doctrine, preserving the Executive’s
responsibility to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed, at least when the
challenge is to the actions of Executive officials. 154
Even were complete United States control over a detainee held by a
foreign entity demonstrated as a factual matter, there would still be no
guarantee that the foreign entity would actually obey the Executive’s
instruction to release the petitioner. The responsible foreign officials might
decide not to release the petitioner for any of a number of reasons, including
their own desire to prosecute him, or an assessment that what the Secretary of
State is officially communicating to them in compliance with a court order is
148. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
149. See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (holding on redressability
ground that mother of illegitimate child lacked standing to sue attorney general for injunction
prohibiting him from declining to prosecute father of her child, since “requested relief . . . would
result only in the jailing of the child’s father;” thus, “prospect that prosecution will, at least in the
future, result in payment of support can, at best, be termed only speculative”).
150. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 106 (1998). The causation
requirement of standing also addresses the third-party issue, asking: “[W]hether the injury is
"fairly . . . traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . the result [of] the
independent action of some third party not before the court." Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976). The causation and redressability components of standing
analysis are closely related and “often prompt identical inquiries.” See also Linda Sandstrom
Simard, Standing Alone: Do We Still Need the Political Question Doctrine, 100 DICK. L. REV.
303, 328 n.146 (1996). However, as I will demonstrate, the inquiries diverge in Abu Ali’s
circumstances, because even assuming that Abu Ali could demonstrate that the United States
government caused his injury by ordering his detention, judicial redress might prove unavailable.
151. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (announcing that standing doctrine is
“built on a single basic idea –the idea of separation of powers”); see also Steel Co., 523 U.S. at
101-02 (“For a court to pronounce upon the meaning or constitutionality of a state or federal law
when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires.”); see
generally Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK L. REV. 881 (1983).
152. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498; see also Simard, supra note 150, at 306 (“[T]he separation of
powers concerns, which have historically led the Court to declare an issue to be a nonjusticiable
political question, could lead the Court today to find a lack of standing.”).
153. 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992).
154. Id. at 576; see also Mark Tushnet, The Transformation and Disappearance of the
Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1219 (2002).
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not what the United States government really wants them to do. Therefore,
Lujan provides some tenuous support for the proposition that the mere fact of
foreign control over a habeas petitioner is sufficient as a matter of law to
preclude federal court jurisdiction on standing (specifically, redressability)
grounds. 155 However, the better reading of Lujan is that, given that the
redressability standard is that the relief must be “likely,” but not “certain,” to
redress the petitioner’s injuries, a factual demonstration of total United States
control over the foreign entity doing the detaining would probably satisfy that
standard, so long as the court order that issued was sufficiently specific in
requiring the Secretary of State to direct the foreign entity to release the
petitioner. 156 In such circumstances, there is a high probability that a direct
command from the Secretary of State would secure the petitioner’s release. 157
However, even assuming that a sufficiently specific court order would be
likely to redress the injuries of a habeas petitioner wrongly detained by a
foreign power at the behest of the United States, it is unlikely that a court could
craft such a remedy consistent with the dictates of the separation of powers. A
court cannot direct the Executive to make specific foreign policy
representations. 158 Beyond the commitment of this authority to the Executive
by the Constitution, even the least intrusive forms of an order directing the
Secretary of State in respect to diplomatic communications could have a highly

155. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(observing that since challenged funding provided by the United States government constituted
only ten percent of total funding for project allegedly creating harm to plaintiffs, “it is entirely
conjectural whether the non-agency activity that affects respondents will be altered or affected by
the agency activity they seek to achieve.”); cf. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 824-825
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I do not think that for purposes of the Article III redressability
requirement we are ever entitled to assume, no matter how objectively reasonable the assumption
may be, that the President (or, for that matter, any official of the Executive or Legislative
Branches), in performing a function that is not wholly ministerial, will follow the advice of a
subordinate official.”); but see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 599 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Even if the
action agencies supply only a fraction of the funding for a particular foreign project, it remains at
least a question for the finder of fact whether threatened withdrawal of that fraction would affect
foreign government conduct sufficiently to avoid harm to listed species.”). The Lujan plurality
opinion thus constitutes an implicit rejection of Professor Cass Sunstein’s proposition that artful
characterization may resolve redressability concerns by, for example, presenting the redress
sought as a reduction in the increased risk of harm rather than an end to the actual harm inflicted
on the individual plaintiff. See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
Injuries, and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 207 (1992).
156. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 24-25, Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d
28 (D.D.C. 2004).
157. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 187
(2000).
158. See Omar, 479 F.3d at 18 (“Any judicial order barring this sort of information sharing in
a military zone would clearly constitute judicial interference in a matter left solely to Executive
discretion . . .”) (Brown, J., dissenting).
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corrosive effect on United States foreign policy interests. Such an order would
at minimum multiply the number of voices with which the United States
speaks. 159
For example, the Executive was likely making certain
representations to the Saudis about the American position on the status of Abu
Ali. If a court issued an order instructing the State Department to direct the
Saudis to release him, such an order would garner significant publicity. The
Executive would likely lose crucial bargaining leverage if perceived as not in
autonomous control of United States foreign policy. The Saudis might bristle
at a U.S. court purporting to evaluate the legitimacy or independence of their
decision to detain a prisoner.
It is worth inquiring more specifically into the actual risks posed by such
an order in the context of Saudi Arabia, and potentially other countries that
remain tenuous allies of the United States in the “war on terrorism.” 160 The
risks posed by an American court dictating the appropriate diplomacy in such a
context are higher in both the probability and magnitude of potentially adverse
outcomes than in almost any other foreign affairs situation imaginable. 161
Saudi Arabia cooperates with the United States intermittently and only with
great difficulty; the fragile relationship of mercenary co-existence between the
two countries is in constant danger of rupture, with unforeseeable and
potentially drastic consequences. 162 Particularly with popular sentiment
against the United States riding high in the wake of the Iraqi invasion, the
Saudis must walk a thin line. They cannot appear to be playing the role of
American puppet, while at the same time they must do just enough not to incur
the wrath of the United States. 163 Further, in the wake of the wake of the May,

159. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (noting “the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question" as constituting one
circumstance justifying application of the political question doctrine).
160. Of course, it is questionable whether courts have the capacity in adjudicating particular
cases to determine country-by-country which relationships are the most fragile and subject to
rupture due to judicial intervention. If not, then prudence counsels abstention in a much wider
range of cases than a case-by-case assessment would suggest is warranted.
161. See Keefe v. Dulles, 222 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Japan Whaling Assoc. v. American
Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221 (1986); see also Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Smith v. Reagan, 844 F.2d 195, 197 (4th Cir. 1988).
162. See generally Michael Levi, Royal Pain, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 2, 2003 (raising the
possibility of the Saudis developing their own nuclear arsenal should the relationship with the
United States fray to the point that the Saudis feel that they can no longer depend on an American
security guarantee).
163. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISTS ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 371-74 (2004); Rachel Bronson, Rethinking Religion:
The Legacy of the U.S.-Saudi Relationship, THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY, Autumn 2005, at 12428; After-affects: The Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2003, at A20 (describing efforts of Saudis
to distance themselves from American investigation in wake of 2003 Riyadh bombings, and
presenting viewpoint that such efforts are due to conservative nature of domestic audience and
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2003, attacks on three housing complexes in Riyadh, the Saudi regime has
entered survival mode and initiated an internally-driven domestic “war on
terrorism” of its own. 164 In this context, American engagement with the
Saudis is a delicate diplomatic dance of pushing and prodding Saudi
government officials into reluctant action, while supplementing the Saudis’
own fears of internal disorder with carefully-calibrated levels of diplomatic
pressure. For an American court to determine that Saudi Arabia arrested a
prisoner at the behest of the United States, and for that court to order publicly
the Executive to obtain his release, and then for Saudi Arabia to then publicly
comply with such an order, would clearly risk destabilizing the AmericanSaudi relationship.
In order to mitigate these separation of powers concerns, a court could
presumably simply direct the Secretary of State to release the prisoner, without
even mentioning the fact of foreign detention. 165 Even assuming that such an
order would be consistent with the separation of powers, the prospect of
judicial policing of Executive adherence to such a vague order poses
overwhelming challenges of judicial administrability. 166 In most habeas cases,
compliance is easily monitored because the order commanding the release of
the prisoner is directed at either the officials with actual custody over the
prisoner or their direct superiors. Under such circumstances, whether or not
the prisoner is released is a direct result of whether the relevant officials have
complied with an order issued by a court exercising structural command
authority over them. Therefore, the fact of the prisoner’s actual release means
that there has been compliance with the court’s order, while ongoing detention
means that the court’s order has been defied. The situation is somewhat
trickier where the actual custodian is a private entity. But even where a private
entity is involved, a court confronted with the fact of ongoing detention in
defiance of a release order would have plentiful and sufficient tools at its
desire to avoid appearance that Saudi governing elite is too solicitous of American interests).
This is especially true in light of the deep domestic conflict roiling Saudi society and politics. See
Michael Dolan, The Saudi Paradox, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 35 (describing split in
Saudi Arabia between “a Westernized elite that looks to Europe and the United States as models
of political development, and a Wahhabi religious establishment that holds up its interpretation of
Islam's golden age as a guide,” and contending that while the former seeks rapprochement with
the United States and his a higher profile abroad, the latter shares goals with Al Qaeda and is
more powerful domestically).
164. Bronson, supra note 163, at 124.
165. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973)
(observing that habeas writ can require prisoner’s outright release from custody).
166. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending – the Role of Legal and Equitable
Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 57-58 (2001) (noting that “concerns of redressability, rightly
isolated, could lead to a decision to refuse to grant equitable relief” where administrative agency’s
“budget allocations and the administrative determinations will be shot through with the types of
discretion that no court of equity can sensibly second guess”).
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disposal to inquire fully into the circumstances of that defiance and issue the
further orders necessary to ensure the actual release of the prisoner.
Such would not be the case in the foreign detention scenario, since in the
event that the foreign entity did not release the petitioner, it would be nearly
impossible for a court to inquire into whether or not the responsible United
States officials had made the requisite good-faith effort to obtain his release. 167
Indeed, a court would be helpless to redress the fact of continued detention by
the foreign power. 168 Diplomacy is a specialized language spoken in the
context of complex and fluid ongoing relationships, and courts are surely not
competent to assess the intricacies and nuances of diplomatic exchanges.169
Further, while a direct command from the Secretary of State to a foreign
official of sufficient rank might suffice to obtain the petitioner’s release,
communications among lower level officials might not. Just as a reviewing
court would lack the expertise and capability to specify itself what the
Secretary of State should do, it would be incapable of evaluating the
Secretary’s compliance with a very general order commanding the petitioner’s
production. Further, any hearing that inquired into whether United States
officials had made a good faith effort would presumably necessitate an
examination of the minutes of diplomatic communications between the United
States and Saudi Arabia, and would itself pose substantial separation of powers
concerns. 170

167. Cf. Omar, 479 F.3d at 18 (Brown, J., dissenting ) (noting that bar on transfer of detainee
to foreign sovereign could be circumvented by possibility that detainee, if released pursuant to
habeas relief, would be immediately arrested by foreign sovereign—“[t]his possibility becomes
an inevitability if United States military officials notify authorities [of foreign sovereign] as to the
exact time and place of [detainee’s] release, thereby effectively ensuring his immediate recapture
and detention”).
168. Cf. id. (“[T]he courts are powerless to enjoin the United States from informing Iraqi
officials about the planned release of [detainee], and under these circumstances, an injunction
against outright transfer is an empty gesture that cannot be sustained.”).
169. See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (warning courts against
"ignoring the delicacies of diplomatic negotiation, the inevitable bargaining for the best solution
of an international conflict”); Nielsen v. Secretary of Treasury, 424 F.2d 833, 844 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (“An important, if not the dominant, star for guiding national actions and reactions is the
desire to build future areas of settlement and good will between nations to replace present areas of
tension. . . . Negotiation may be deferred while relationships are left to simmer without stirring,
in order to strengthen any possible threads of international accord or reconciliation.").
170. Another consideration is that even assuming the existence of a constitutionally
appropriate remedy, it is unclear to what extent the executive branch would feel compelled to
obey in good faith a judicial order commanding the Secretary of State to request or direct the
release of a prisoner held by the Saudis. Notions of constitutionalism and rule of law, firmly
entrenched since Marbury v. Madison, would counsel that a court with appropriate jurisdiction
has the last word on a concrete dispute, and other government actors must obey at least with
respect to the individual litigants. See Omar, 479 F.3d at 13 (“[W]e think it exceedingly unlikely
that American military officers, sworn to uphold the law and represented by the Justice
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Thus, in essence, the court that issued an order commanding the Secretary
of State to produce the petitioner would have no ability to ensure compliance.
While the assumption is that United States officials will obey court orders in
good faith, that principle has limits. Judicial inability to police Executive
action in this area—combined with the uncertainties resulting from the fact of
foreign control—would render a redress of injuries unlikely and speculative.
Such a conclusion is not an “invitation of executive lawlessness,” 171 but rather
an acknowledgment of limited judicial competence.
B.

Conceptions of the Rights/Remedies Distinction in the Habeas Context

The separation of powers and standing obstacles to the assertion of
jurisdiction posed by the habeas remedy in the context of foreign control over a
petitioner pose the significant quandary of reconciling a potentially clear
violation of constitutional rights with the absence of a judicial remedy. This
conflict between the rights-focused and the remedies-focused inquiries raises
the larger question of what role the judiciary should play vis-à-vis the political
branches in the ongoing jurisprudential battles that will surely characterize the
“war on terrorism.”
Viewpoints on the relationship between rights and remedies, particularly,
whether a remedy must attend every violation of a constitutional right, have
undergone substantial evolution since Marbury v. Madison’s declaration that
“[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury.” 172 In the typical case, “there is a ‘presumption that for every right
there should be a remedy.’” 173 However, as Professors Richard Fallon and
Daniel Meltzer have observed, “Marbury’s apparent promise of effective
redress for all constitutional violations reflects a principle, not an ironclad rule,
and its ideal is not always attained.” 174 From Marbury’s seemingly
Department, would evade an order of a United States district court.”). However, the assurance of
good faith adherence is highly questionable in a context such as Abu Ali where neither the courts
nor the public are likely to have good information, the activity subject to judicial order is within
the core competence of the Executive, and manifold legitimate reasons can plausibly coexist with
a result indicative of noncompliance. As Friedman notes, “there is a continuum of nonenforcement of judicial decrees,” with one end of the spectrum constituting open defiance of clear
judicial orders such as in Ex parte Merryman, extending through the “foot-dragging that
accompanied federal court school desegregation decrees,” and ending with legitimate nonenforcement, exemplified by the pardon power. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial
Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577, 645 (1993).
171. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 601 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
172. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
173. TRIBE, supra note 97, § 3-31, at 601 (citing United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 616
(1990)).
174. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1770-71 (1991).
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unequivocal stance mandating the availability of a remedy for every violation
of a right, the Supreme Court has carved out a number of doctrinal exceptions.
Pointing to the political question, sovereign immunity, and equitable discretion
doctrines, as well as the Constitution’s own exclusion of judicial review over
certain claims, Justice Scalia trenchantly observed in dissent in Webster v. Doe
that “it is simply untenable that there must be a judicial remedy for every
constitutional violation.” 175
Further complicating the rights-remedies question is the deep-rooted
habeas remedy. Along with the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, habeas is the only specific remedy explicitly referenced in the
Constitution. 176 In INS v. St. Cyr, the Supreme Court suggested (by straining
to avoid the question) that the Suspension Clause guarantees a constitutionallymandated core of federal habeas jurisdiction, at least in the context of judicial
review of the legality of executive detention, that Congress cannot strip. 177
Hamdi and the Guantanamo cases have highlighted various rightsremedies permutations in the context of habeas. One position is that adopted
by Justice Thomas’s dissent in Hamdi, and the district court opinion in Khalid
v. Bush, 178 both of which suggested that while the Guantanamo detainees have
access to the remedial habeas “vessel,” they have no substantive rights. Justice
Thomas in Hamdi does suggest that the Court has an independent, if highly
deferential, role in evaluating the legality of Hamdi’s detention. 179 However,
Justice Thomas also makes clear that Hamdi has essentially no substantive
rights capable of judicial enforcement, since (i) his detention is lawful if he is
an enemy combatant, and (ii) the determination as to whether he is an enemy

175. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 609-613 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Members of
Congress and the supervising officers of the Executive Branch take the same oath to uphold the
Constitution that we do, and sometimes they are left to perform that oath unreviewed, as we
always are.”); see also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 174, at 1784 (“[M]odern doctrines, beyond
any peradventure, depart decisively from the notion that the Constitution requires effective
remedies for all victims of constitutional violations.”).
176. Moreover, the “availability of the writ under the new Constitution . . . was [Hamilton’s]
basis for arguing that additional, explicit procedural protections were unnecessary.” See FALLON,
JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 141, at 68.
177. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305-06 (2001). The Supreme Court construed the
statute at issue in St. Cyr, which appeared to preclude any appellate review of an order of
deportation issued against a resident alien for the commission of an enumerated offense, so as to
permit habeas review over pure matters of law.
178. Rasul v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005).
179. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 585 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I acknowledge
that the question of whether Hamdi’s executive detention is lawful is a question properly resolved
by the Judicial Branch, although the question comes to the Court with the strongest presumptions
in favor of the Government.”).
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combatant is within the sole discretion of the Executive. 180 According to
Justice Thomas, federal courts should dismiss any habeas petition, at least one
brought by a citizen caught and held outside the United States or presumably
by any alien held outside the United States, in which the government simply
alleges that the individual detained is an enemy combatant; once these words
are spoken, the Court has no capacity to delve into the government’s process or
the substance supporting that determination.
The District Court for the District of Columbia expressed an even starker
view in Khalid, concluding that nonresident aliens detained in Guantanamo–
whom Rasul held enjoyed the statutory right to judicial review of the legality
of their detention–”lack any viable theory under the United States Constitution
to challenge the lawfulness of their continued detention at Guantanamo”
because they “possess no cognizable constitutional rights.” 181 Despite dicta in
Rasul to the contrary, 182 the Khalid Court relied heavily on language in that
opinion limiting the holding to the question of “whether the federal courts have
jurisdiction to determine the legality of the Executive’s potentially indefinite
detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing.” 183
The Abu Ali case is the mirror image of Hamdi and Khalid. As an
American citizen, Abu Ali possessed substantive constitutional rights to due
process that clearly would be violated by the government conduct described in
his allegations. What is unclear, however, is whether the habeas remedy is the
appropriate vehicle for the vindication of these rights, and more pointedly and
accurately–since petition for a writ of habeas corpus was Abu Ali’s only
judicial option–whether he had any judicial remedy at all.

180. See id. (“[I]t is appropriate for the Court to determine the judicial question whether the
President has the asserted authority . . . [but] we lack the information and expertise to question
whether Hamdi is actually an enemy combatant, a question the resolution of which is committed
to other branches.”). Justice Thomas would find a violation only under the most egregious
circumstances. See id. (citing Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (“[T]he Government could not
detain a loyal citizen pursuant to executive and congressional authorities that could not
conceivably be implicated given the Government’s factual allegations.”)).
181. Rasul, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 321. The court relied heavily on precedent indicating that
nonresident aliens enjoy no constitutional protections under the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 32122 (citing to Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259 (1990)).
182. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 n.15 (2004) (citing to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
(“Petitioners’ allegations . . . unquestionably describe ‘custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States.’”)).
183. Id. at 485; see Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 323 (“[T]he Supreme Court chose to only
answer the question of jurisdiction, and not the question of whether these same individuals
possess any substantive rights on the merits of their claims.”).
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C. Conceptions of the Judiciary
Broad conceptions of the judicial function guide the inquiry into the proper
judicial role when clear violations of constitutional rights coincide with the
absence of realistic remedial options. Professor Fallon proposed three broad
conceptions of the judiciary, all foreshadowed by Marbury.
First, the traditional “private rights” model emerged from consideration of
the anomalous status of judicial review under a democratic constitution and the
historically narrow restriction of the definition of justiciable cases. 184 Several
clear rules emerge from this conception: (i) a federal court must determine
every valid claim of constitutional right in a case properly before it; 185 (ii) as a
corollary proposition, “courts are justified in pronouncing on constitutional
issues only insofar as they must do so to resolve concrete disputes”; 186 and (iii)
courts should avoid “any role as a general overseer of government conduct,
and should especially avoid the award of remedies that invade traditional
legislative and executive prerogatives.” 187Thus, the judiciary violates the
separation of powers when it reviews actions of the coordinate branches that
do not give rise to a “case” or “controversy,” a concept that encompasses the
requirement, encapsulated in the Supreme Court’s standing doctrine, that the
wrong suffered by the complaining party be capable of judicial redress. 188
Limiting judicial review to concrete disputes prevents the type of unmoored

184. See FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 141, at 67.
185. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 291 (1821) (“It is most true that this
Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction
if it should.”); Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170 ("The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the
rights of individuals."); see also Richard H. Fallon, Marbury and the Constitutional Mind, 91
CAL. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2003) (private rights model mandates that “[w]hen a constitutional issue
arises within a traditionally framed case and is necessary to the determination of private rights,
courts have no discretion to avoid the issue or to decline to enforce constitutional rights.”)
[hereinafter Fallon, Marbury and the Constitutional Mind].
186. Fallon, Marbury and the Constitutional Mind, supra note 185, at 33.
187. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S, supra note 141, at 67.
188. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818-20 (1997) (“‘No principle is more fundamental to
the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of
federal court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies’. . . . [O]ur standing inquiry has been
especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether an
action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.”);
TRIBE, supra note 97, at 392 (§ 3-14) (“The Court’s current formulation [of the standing doctrine]
presents one aspect of the continuing debate over whether federal courts exist primarily to resolve
concrete disputes among individual litigants, with the power to make constitutional decisions
only a necessary incident to this role, or whether federal courts have a special responsibility, as
the branch of government best able to develop a coherent interpretation of the Constitution, to
engage in the exposition of constitutional norms, limited primarily by the requirement that they
do so in the context of reasonably concrete disputes presented to them for review”).
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constitutional interpretation that risks bringing the federal courts into
“unnecessary conflict with coordinate branches.” 189
By contrast, the “special functions” model conceptualized the judiciary,
especially the Supreme Court, as an essential safeguard against overreaching
by the coordinate branches. Marbury foreshadowed the “special functions”
model by positing the necessary coincidence between rights and remedies and
establishing the judiciary’s legal authority to “compel the performance of legal
duties by high governmental officials,” even though the enumeration of these
principles was not necessary to the resolution of Marbury itself. 190 The key
premise of the special functions model is that the articulation of constitutional
norms by courts constitutes a general public good, independent (in part) of the
imperative to remedy a particular wrongdoing. 191
Lastly, the “prudential” model counsels the avoidance of rulings that
would provoke threatening confrontations with the political branches. 192 This
prudential strand is in many cases not recognized explicitly, but operates at a
subterranean level, pushing courts away from logically sound holdings that
could generate significant inter-branch conflict. 193 Its influence extends back
to Marbury, where according to Professor Fallon, “the Court reached the only
prudent conclusion: It could not, indeed must not, issue a quixotic order to
Madison to deliver Marbury’s commission.” 194
The circumstances in Abu Ali supply an example of constitutional conflict
of the highest order, an alleged egregious violation of an individual’s due
process rights meeting core separation of powers and standing concerns that at
the remedial stage appear unavoidable and severe. The private rights, special
functions, and prudential models offer distinctive frameworks for determining
justiciability. The private rights model would normally push hard towards

189. TRIBE, supra note 97, at 388 (§ 3-14); see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,
188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[R]epeated and essentially head-on confrontations between
the life-tenured branch and the representative branches of government will not, in the long run, be
beneficial to either. The public confidence essential to the former and the vitality critical to the
latter may well erode if we do not exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our power to negative
the actions of the other branches.").
190. Fallon, Marbury and the Constitutional Mind, supra note 185, at 16; see also Henry P.
Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365-66 (1973)
(positing that Marbury established the groundwork for the special functions model).
191. See Fallon, Marbury and the Constitutional Mind, supra note 185, at 15 (“[T]here is a
public interest, appropriately enforced through public-rights litigation, in ensuring official
conformity to legal and especially constitutional norms.”).
192. See id. at 17 (“[T]he Court must sometimes recede from conflict with the political
branches or with aroused public opinion in order to maintain its prestige and thus its power.”).
193. See id. at 29 (identifying “cases in which the Supreme Court has shaped particular
rulings (rather than entire doctrines) to avert public hostility but has not expressly acknowledged
this motivation as a basis for decision”).
194. Id. at 18.
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requiring that a reviewing court permit a case alleging executive detention in
derogation of constitutional rights to go forward on the merits. However, due
to the unique circumstances present in Abu Ali, separation of powers
considerations that foreclose the possibility of effective remediation at the back
end, the redressability requirement of standing doctrine likely serves to bar
jurisdiction. 195
A court following the “special functions” model, by contrast, might adopt a
broad interpretation of the redressability requirement of standing to allow the
judicial inquiry to move forward and shine public light on any constitutional
violations, even if the court would be unable to actually remedy these
violations. 196 Additional considerations would apply were the Supreme Court
to hear the case, even in the absence of a viable remedy for the individual
detained, any holding by the Supreme Court that the government’s scheme for
detaining American citizens through the agency of foreign governments is
unconstitutional would presumably bind the Executive in future instances
under the principle established in Cooper v. Aaron (a decision itself motivated
by special functions considerations). 197 The pronouncements of a lower
federal court would not have such a binding effect over federal government
officials (absent a specific remedy), 198 but they could have a powerful
persuasive effect. 199 Perhaps more importantly, any such holding would stand,
and be perceived, as a public rebuke by a judicial actor of official government
action. 200

195. See supra Part II.C.
196. See James E. Pfander, The Limits of Habeas Jurisdiction and the Global War on
Terrorism, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 523-24 (2006) (noting, in course of expressing approval of
assertion of jurisdiction in Abu Ali, that “[r]elaxation of the custody requirement to permit
challenges in constructive-custody cases enables the habeas petitioner to probe the extent of the
U.S. government's responsibility for his detention and to secure relief for any improper
government conduct,” even if “a federal court would have no role in overseeing” certain further
decisions by the foreign government”); cf. Fallon, Marbury and the Constitutional Mind, supra
note 185, at 26-27 (noting how Supreme Court was apparently motivated by special functions
concerns in adopting broad interpretation of injury-in-fact requirement of standing doctrine in
voting rights and Establishment Clause cases).
197. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (holding that government actors have a responsibility to obey the
Supreme Court’s pronouncements as to what the Constitution requires); see Fallon, Marbury and
the Constitutional Mind, supra note 185, at 24 & n.105.
198. Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571 (1992) (“[I]t is not likely that an
agency would feel compelled to accede to the legal view of a district court expressed in a case to
which it was not a party.”).
199. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 803 (1992) (“[W]e may assume it is
substantially likely that the President and other executive and congressional officials would abide
by an authoritative interpretation of the census statute and constitutional provision by the district
court, even though they would not be directly bound by such a determination.”).
200. See Richard H. Fallon, The Constitution and Legitimacy, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787
(2005) (discussing relationship between legal, sociological, and moral factors and the perceived
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The prudential model mainly functions in the intersection of the other two
models, providing impetus for courts to disclaim jurisdiction when conflict
with the political branches looms. Prudential factors in the context of a case
like Abu Ali might motivate a court, particularly a lower court, to accord
heightened deference to the Executive’s separation of power arguments.
However, the deep constitutional roots of habeas relief strongly counter the
force of separation of power arguments for heightened deference, since a
court’s refusal to intervene, on institutional comity grounds that do not clearly
rise to the constitutional level, to free a citizen imprisoned unconstitutionally
would seem itself to raise grave constitutional concerns. 201
The reasoning of the Abu Ali court itself appears strongly motivated by the
“special functions” model, in particular, the court does not even address the
standing and separation of powers difficulties posed by the remedial back-end
of the litigation. The Abu Ali court’s approach bears strong similarity to that
adopted by the Supreme Court in Rasul, permitting the assertion of habeas
jurisdiction while deferring to a later stage resolution of problems posed by the
required depth of the substantive inquiry or the possibility of a viable final
remedy. 202
Supreme Court pronouncements on the merits of habeas petitions under
conditions where judicial redress is unlikely have played a storied role as a
platform for the Court to speak about pressing questions of executive power
and individual rights. During the Civil War, the case of Ex parte Merryman
presented Chief Justice Taney with the question of whether the President could
unilaterally order suspension of the writ of habeas corpus without
congressional authorization. 203
President Lincoln had granted military
authorities along the military line between Philadelphia and Washington
authorization to suspend the privilege of the writ for the “public” safety in
cases of civil resistance, mainly to address widespread secessionist sentiment
in Baltimore. 204 Chief Justice Taney issued the writ, but the commanding
general at Fort McHenry who was Merryman’s immediate custodian did not
show up on the appointed day, and did not produce Merryman. 205
Nevertheless, the Chief Justice subsequently held that President Lincoln lacked
the power to suspend the writ, that Merryman had to be released, and that the

legitimacy of constitutional rulings). As Fallon observes, “public officials . . . take oaths to
enforce the law. The resulting obligations to uphold the law, whatever it might be, carry moral
weight. If an action would be legally illegitimate, then an official presumptively ought not to take
it, for it would be contrary to her oath and, accordingly, most often morally illegitimate as well
under our minimally legitimate Constitution.” Id. at 1849.
201. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 118 & 182.
203. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
204. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 278 (1994).
205. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
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general who had refused to appear was in contempt. The Chief Justice realized
that his task was largely fruitless: “I have exercised all the power which the
constitution and laws confer upon me, but that power has been resisted by a
force too strong for me to overcome.” 206 He nevertheless directed that the
order go directly to the President, “call[ing] upon him to perform his
constitutional duty to enforce the laws. In other words, to enforce the process
of this court.” 207
Chief Justice Taney knew with near certainty that Merryman’s
custodian would not obey the order commanding Merryman’s release.
However, Taney’s hope was that in expounding on the governing
constitutional principles, and in declaring judicial supremacy in establishing
those principles, he could exhort the Executive to comply with them. In
directly confronting the Executive and demanding obedience to the Court’s
dictates, Taney was breaking new ground. As Paulsen has pointed out,
“Merryman was probably the first genuine assertion of judicial supremacy over
the executive to appear in a federal court opinion. Taney was emphatic that the
President was constitutionally bound to do what the courts ordered him to do
and that he did not have independent interpretive authority.” 208 For Taney
because the Executive would be bound by the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the Constitution, a change in executive policy in response to his holding
would be both obliged by the constitutional structure and presumably just as
effective as direct adherence to the order commanding Merryman’s release.
Moreover, Taney hoped to rely on general principles of structural government,
rather than any particular rule of law principles directly related to the specific
circumstances of Merryman’s detention, to spur executive compliance.
The situation today is obviously differently than the one confronting Chief
Justice Taney in 1861. The broad conception of judicial supremacy is now
firmly entrenched after Cooper. 209 And, of course, whatever the obligation of
the Executive to craft a response consistent with the constitutional
pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the Executive would have no such
obligation to comply with the pronouncements of a district court. Nonetheless,

206. Id.
207. This quote is not from the opinion; Taney was reported by a local newspaper to have
said it from the bench. See CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-64 847 (1974); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Decision-making, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 91 (1993).
208. Paulson, supra note 204, at 278-79.
209. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. Although the case is not without its critics,
see, e.g., Edwin Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L.J. 979, 982-83 (1987); see also
Paulson, supra note 204, at 223 (observing that since the structure of the government is one of
coordinate branches, the executive has the option "to execute or decline to execute judgments
rendered by courts").
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from the perspective of the “special functions” model, the factors supporting
discovery and judicial evaluation of the issues involved in cases such as Abu
Ali are strong, even in the absence of prospective judicial remediation. Judicial
review can shine a bright light on troublesome executive action. Apart from
the narrow issue of its legality, the broader implications of the United States
government instructing the Saudis to have their way with an American citizen
are potentially enormous, and deserve public airing. 210 Disinfection is also
particularly valuable given the nature of the questionable practices engaged in
by the Bush Administration, which apparently views rendition and similar
practices as means to avoiding constitutional scrutiny in American courts of
lengthy and judicially-unexamined detentions, perhaps involving torture. Such
executive gamesmanship when it comes to individual liberties is uniquely
troubling during a time of war because the potential political checks on the
Executive disregard for the principles of constitutionalism, due process, and
individual autonomy are likely to be least powerful during periods of national
crisis.
The moral and public relations impact of a judicial declaration that a
government scheme is violating a citizen’s rights is also substantial. 211 Rasul
led to the establishment of “Combatant Status Review Tribunals,” modeled
closely on Justice O’Connor’s recommendation in Hamdi regarding the
procedures due American citizens, to determine the “enemy combatant” status
of Guantanamo detainees. 212 And, the Abu Ali court’s assertion of jurisdiction
prodded the Executive into bringing Abu Ali to the United States and charging
him. 213 By asserting jurisdiction, the respective courts in these cases shed light
on troublesome executive action, and through some combination of moral
persuasion and public relations pressure, generated rights-protecting changes in
government behavior.
Nevertheless, clearly one reason why we want courts to observe principles
of standing generally, and the principle of redressability in particular, is to
avoid relatively unmoored judicial inquiries by judges who are not in position
to consider the multifaceted implications of those inquiries. A judge will likely
feel freer to paint with broad strokes if he is aware that he can say what he
likes because he will never have to confront the direct implications of ordering
the release of a prisoner such as Abu Ali, with all the potentially explosive

210. Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005) (discussing traumatic effects of loosening of prohibition against
torture on legal system, and in particular its general commitment to human dignity and nonbrutality).
211. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
212. See Defense Link Website, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040730
comb.pdf (last visited April 13, 2007); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-34 (2004).
213. See supra notes 14-16.
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ramifications such an order could entail. This is problematic, because judges
confronting the vexing conflict between individual liberties and security during
wartime must be exquisitely attuned to practical considerations and the
necessity of allowing the Executive to function flexibly and decisively. 214
Another more foundational question raised by the special functions model
is whether courts should be in the business of seeking to generate political
change. While the prospect of the government directing foreign countries to
detain American citizens without even the pretense of procedure is profoundly
troubling, it seems problematic for courts to assert jurisdiction over cases that
do not meet redressability requirements so as to generate political change in
line with personal preferences. 215 If the Executive has decided that its course
is the proper one (and Congress has not intervened), and if the separation of
powers and lack of manageable judicial standards considerations are truly
significant enough impediments to preclude effective review on the merits,
then courts should probably cede the field to the political branches.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, there may be a means to achieving the broader goals of the
special functions approach while still adhering to the requirements of standing
doctrine. Professors Fallon and Meltzer provide a framework for addressing
the problem, positing two considerations in assessing whether particular
remedies may be denied for constitutional violations. The first is the Marbury
principle that “calls for individually effective remediation.” As we have seen,
other considerations can sometimes outweigh this principle. 216 Another
principle, emerging from constitutional structure “demands a system of
constitutional remedies adequate to keep government generally within the
bounds of law,” in particular the values expressed by notions of separation of
214. A consideration expounded upon at length in Eisentrager:
To grant the writ to these prisoners might mean that our army must transport them across
the seas for hearing. This would require allocation of shipping space, guarding personnel,
billeting and rations. It might also require transportation for whatever witnesses the
prisoners desired to call as well as transportation for those necessary to defend legality of
the sentence. . . . [T]rials would hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the
enemy. They would diminish the prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but
with wavering neutrals. It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field
commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call
him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military
offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home. Nor is it unlikely that the result of such
enemy litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial and military opinion highly
comforting to enemies of the United States.
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778-79 (1950).
215. See Barkow, supra note 103, at 301 (observing that “the judiciary's independence and
isolation from popular pressures and sentiment make it a poor policymaker”).
216. See supra notes 173-175.
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powers and the rule of law. 217 This larger requirement of an overall system of
remedies “effective in maintaining a regime of lawful government–is more
unyielding in its own terms,” but can still hold even if individual redress is
denied entirely. 218 According to Professors Fallon and Meltzer, it “would be
intolerable” to have “a regime of public administration that was systematically
unanswerable to the restraints of law, as identified from a relatively detached
and independent judicial perspective.” 219
Applied to the circumstances in Abu Ali, this framework suggests that
while the importance of Abu Ali obtaining individual redress through the
remedy of habeas corpus may be outweighed by the dictates of the separation
of powers and related considerations, the requirement that some legal
framework sufficient to prevent the deprivation of due process rights
effectively restrain the Executive may have more bite. In deciding how to
approach the difficult cases, courts should take cognizance of the institutional
restraints binding the Executive, and in particular, Congress’s willingness to
pass appropriate legislation, oversee its implementation, and if necessary
employ the political tools at its disposal, such as the appropriations power, to
ensure the President’s acquiescence. As a historical example of such
legislative action, Professor Pfander relates how the British Parliament adopted
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which prohibited “the practice of removing
prisoners from the jurisdiction to deprive them of habeas,” in part to counter
the Crown’s efforts to evade habeas remedies by transferring prisoners to
Scotland for detention. 220 The post-9/11 Congresses have proven more
quiescent, if not completely so. 221 If Congress has demonstrated a willingness

217. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 174, at 1778-79, 1788-89 (“an important role of the
judiciary is to represent the people's continuing interest in the protection of long-term values, of
which popular majorities, no less than their elected representatives, might sometimes lose sight”).
218. Id. at 1779.
219. Id.
220. James E. Pfander, supra note 196, at n.178 (citing R.J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS
CORPUS 18, 199 (2d ed. 1989)).
221. The most prominent recent example of congressional action to reign in the Executive in
this area is the amendment to the 2006 Defense Appropriations Act sponsored by Senator John
McCain, which states in relevant part that “No individual in the custody or under the physical
control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be
subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.” See National Defense
Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2006, H.R. 1815, 109th Cong. 1403 (2006); Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 1003, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739 (2005). Senator
McCain’s language was ultimately included in the 2006 National Defense Authorization and
Department of Defense Appropriations Acts. Id. In signing the Defense Appropriations Act,
President Bush indicated (i) his intention to construe it in line with his view of Executive power
and (ii) his interpretation that it did not create a private right of action. See President's Statement
on Signing of H.R. 2863, Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to
Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 (Dec. 30, 2005),
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to act forcefully to restrain unconstitutional practices, courts should hew more
closely to the “private rights” approach, thus permitting the political process to
operate and adjust for any imperfections. If Congress has not demonstrated
such a will, courts must fill the breach and adopt an approach more in line with
“special functions” considerations.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051230-8.html. Whether Congress
will enforce the provision in light of the President’s clear opposition remains an open question.
See Senator John W. Warner, R-Va. & Senator John McCain, R-Ariz., Statements on Presidential
Signing Detainee Provisions (Jan. 4, 2006), http://mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=
Newscenter.ViewPressRelease&Content_id=1634 (“Our Committee intends through strict
oversight to monitor the Administration's implementation of the new law.”); see generally David
Abramowitz, Taking the Bull by the Horns: Congress and International Humanitarian Law, 38
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 599 (2006).

